Environmental Politics and Conflict Research Paper

This sample Environmental Politics and Conflict Research Paper is published for educational and informational purposes only. Like other free research paper examples, it is not a custom research paper. If you need help writing your assignment, please use our custom writing services and buy a paper on any of the political science research paper topicsThis sample research paper on environmental politics and conflict features 4800+ words (19 pages), an outline, APA format in-text citations, and a bibliography with 42 sources.

Outline

I. Introduction

II. Theory

A. Environmental Scarcity

B. Social Pressures

1. Reduced Agricultural Production

2. Economic Decline

3. Migration

4. Disruption of Social Relations

C. Conflict Types

1. Environmental Scarcity Leads to Simple Scarcity Conflicts

2. Environmental Scarcity Leads to Group Identity Conflicts

3. Environmental Scarcity Leads to Insurgencies Against the State

D. Critiques

1. Defining Environmental Security

2. The Direction of Causality

3. Empirical Evidence

III. Applications and Empirical Evidence

A. Environmental Scarcity and Conflicts of Simple Scarcity

B. Environmental Scarcity and Conflicts of Group Identity and Insurgency

IV. Policy Implications

V. Future Directions

VI. Conclusion

I. Introduction

Since the last years of the cold war, the study of security and conflict has moved forward from traditional interstate wars to consider issues of human security. Ullman (1983) was one of the first to call for the field of security studies to include nontraditional forms of conflict, and other scholars (Kaplan, 1994; Matthews, 1989) soon followed, noting in particular the role that environmental issues could play in creating and exacerbating conflict between states.

Connections between environmental scarcity and conflict date to the original work of Thomas Malthus (1798), who predicted that the difference in the rate of growth in population and food supply would eventually lead to Earth’s population overtaking the food supply. Choucri and North (1975) argue that rising population creates an increased demand on limited resources, which in turn causes “lateral pressure” that leads countries to seek resources outside their borders via conquest. However, the field of environment and conflict really took hold in 1991 with the publication of Thomas Homer-Dixon’s article titled “On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict” in the journal International Security. This article laid the groundwork for new thinking about how environmental scarcity can lead to social changes that in turn create breeding grounds for intra- and interstate conflict.

This research paper examines the foundational ideas of Homer-Dixon and his colleagues at the University of Toronto, dubbed the Toronto Group; the additions and critiques offered by other scholars in the field; the empirical evidence for and against the Toronto Group’s hypotheses; the policy implications of the argument; and the future directions of research in environment and conflict.

II. Theory

There are numerous environmental challenges that can create incentives for conflict. Issues such as climate change, deforestation, depletion of fish stocks, water pollution, ozone layer depletion, and degradation of agricultural land present clear challenges to policymakers interested in avoiding conflict. For centuries, human settlement patterns have followed the path of natural resources and their ability to provide food, water, and shelter. Changes to these environments can therefore disrupt established social patterns and lead to conflicts between groups and states. Essentially, environmental scarcity puts pressure on existing social processes, resulting in decreased agricultural production, economic decline, population displacement, and disruption of normal patterns of social relations. This potentially leads to conflict between states and societies (Homer- Dixon, 1991).

A. Environmental Scarcity

Homer-Dixon (1998) defines environmental scarcity as “scarcity of renewable resources such as cropland, forests, river water, and fish stocks” (p. 8). There are three types of environmental stress or scarcity. Supply scarcity results when an existing resource is depleted, such as when deforestation reduces the availability of lumber for fuel and shelter. Demand for the resource remains the same, but there is less of it to go around. The second type is demand scarcity. This occurs when the resource stock remains static, but the population relying on the resource increases, through either higher levels of growth or migration. Supply of the resource remains the same, but it must be split into smaller pieces to accommodate everyone. The third type of scarcity results when the distribution of the resource is not equal. Supply or demand may remain unchanged, but groups may have unequal access to the resource, creating a system of haves and have-nots.

Environmental scarcity can result from several different factors. Changes in the environment can lead to degradation of an existing resource. For example, global warming could lead to rising sea levels, creating soil erosion and flooding that reduces the supply of resources in an area. Alternatively, high levels of population growth, as commonly found in developing countries, can increase demand pressures on local agricultural yields or fish stocks. Finally, government policies can create unequal access to resources, with certain groups being favored over others. The Israeli government, for example, routinely allowed Israeli settlers greater access than Arab settlers to scarce water resources in the West Bank settlements.

B. Social Pressures

Environmental scarcity can negatively impact social relations and economic development, which can increase tensions between states and groups and create conditions ripe for conflict. Scholars note four social pressures in particular that can lead to conflict: reduced agricultural production, economic decline, population displacement, and disruption of normal patterns of social relations (Homer-Dixon, 1991).

1. Reduced Agricultural Production

Reduced agricultural production could result from numerous environmental changes, such as deforestation, increased runoff, soil erosion, and flooding from climate change. Agricultural land located in low-lying regions such as Bangladesh is particularly vulnerable to the more intense storms and flooding expected of climate change. Indeed, changes in precipitation and insect migration patterns could have devastating impacts on agricultural yields. Likewise, deforestation practices accelerate erosion, leaving fertile lands vulnerable to flooding during seasons of high precipitation. It is unclear whether technological developments will be able to ensure continued increases in agricultural yields when resources are faced with these kinds of environmental changes. In developing countries in particular, agriculture is a large share of the economy and the key to economic growth, and the impact of reduced production would be profoundly felt (Homer- Dixon, 1998).

2. Economic Decline

A second social effect of environmental scarcity is centered on economic development. Economic decline can result from numerous environmental changes, such as environmental disasters from climate change, deforestation practices hurting river trade and decreasing fuel wood, the loss of fish stocks, and increased pollution’s increasing the prevalence of human disease. Overall economic development may be constrained by these changes, or even more likely, such changes could result in an increase in the wealth gap between elites and nonelites (Homer-Dixon, 1998).

Short-term efforts at increasing economic production can have long-term implications that lead to overall decline. Logging, for example, can be a productive industry in the short term, but deforestation can lower productivity over time. Likewise, increasing energy consumption is a mark of development, but the long-term implications of global warming can be very costly. Indeed, in 2006 the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change noted that halting global warming would cost around 1% of global gross domestic product—but failing to do so could cost up to 20% of gross domestic product (Stern, 2006).

3. Migration

A third potential impact of environmental scarcity is an increase in the number of environmental refugees (Jacobson, 1988; Westing, 1992) migrating because of environmental pressures in their home region (push) or economic opportunity elsewhere (pull). Homer-Dixon (1998) suggests that a key factor influencing migration is the gap between satisfaction in the home region and expected satisfaction in the new region. For example, migration patterns in China from rural to urban regions can partially be attributed to scarce resources in the interior leading to lower rates of economic growth. This may be due to either environmental change or, more likely, high rates of population growth, which create demand scarcities on resources. Citizens leave, not only because of the lack of resources in the home region but in order to seek opportunities in areas of higher growth.

4. Disruption of Social Relations

The fourth impact of environmental scarcity is a disruption of normal patterns of social behavior. “Scarcity sharpens distinctions between winners and losers— between groups that profit from scarcity and those that are hurt” (Homer-Dixon, 1998, p. 96). Groups that may have peacefully coexisted in a time of plenty become encouraged to focus on group survival, creating tense interactions with other resource-dependent groups also focused on survival. Existing divisions between ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups become reinforced, and these groups may decide to confront authority figures with violence rather than with peaceful negotiation. Social institutions such as the state itself may become fractured as a result (Homer- Dixon, 1998).

C. Conflict Types

These social effects may, in turn, cause several specific types of acute conflict, including scarcity disputes between countries, clashes between ethnic groups, and civil strife and insurgency, each with potentially serious repercussions for the security interests of the developed world. Three types of conflict might result from the social pressures caused by environmental scarcity.

1. Environmental Scarcity Leads to Simple Scarcity Conflicts

Simple scarcity conflicts arise when structural conditions lead states to use violence to increase their share of the resource pie (Choucri & North, 1975). Structural theories suggest that as the power of challenger groups rises, challenger groups may choose to challenge the existing authorities with violence rather than with peaceful measures, in anticipation of moving from challenger to authority (Homer-Dixon, 1998). Simple scarcity conflicts, therefore, can be considered resource wars. Although conflicts over coal, oil, or other strategic resources would fit into this category, the clear focus is on wars over renewable resources. There are a number of examples of the former, such as World War I, the Falklands War, and the Persian Gulf War, but the latter is much more rare, leading the Toronto Group to downplay the role of environmental scarcity in causing this type of conflict.

2. Environmental Scarcity Leads to Group Identity Conflicts

A second type of conflict occurs when population growth and migration create problems between groups. Us versus them conflicts develop as groups move from areas in decline to areas of new opportunities and interact with the inhabitants, who now must split their fixed resources among more people. These demand-type scarcities exacerbate tensions between groups that may have peacefully coexisted in the past and interact with other social and political factors to create possibilities for violent conflict. The conflicts in Darfur and Rwanda could fall into this category.

3. Environmental Scarcity Leads to Insurgencies against the State

Environmental scarcity can also increase the likelihood of violent challenges to the state. As one group experiences deprivation, it will measure its access to resources against the access of other groups, particularly those holding political power. As the relative deprivation of a group not in authority increases, a sense of economic justice may lead to an increase in its grievances against the group with authority. It may look for opportunities to challenge the group in power, and circumstances may align to lead to a change in the relative power between these groups. If the disenfranchised group perceives that power relations have changed, then it may choose to address its grievances against current authorities through violence. For example, in the early 1990s in Chiapas, Mexico, economic reforms weakened the existing regime and its ability to maintain power through coercive measures. Other social institutions—notably the Catholic Church—stepped into the gap, creating social support for challenger groups and helping to create an “insurgent consciousness” (Homer-Dixon, 1998).

D. Critiques

The work of the Toronto Group is not without its critics. Criticism of these arguments focuses on three main areas: the definition of environmental conflict and security, a chicken-and-egg debate over whether environmental scarcity leads to or results from conflict, and the empirical evidence supporting the above hypotheses.

1. Defining Environmental Security

The Toronto Group’s argument advocates a comprehensive view of security issues that includes environmental causes of conflict. Several scholars disagree with this approach. Frederick (1999) argues that security should be divided into two categories: traditional security issues and nontraditional problems. Deudney (1999) takes this claim further, noting that environmental security issues have causes that are fundamentally different from the causes of traditional security concerns. Traditional threats, for example, result from external aggression and provoke an us-versus- them mentality; environmental conflict, however, is a long-term threat that requires states to cooperate in order to solve it. Scholars continue to be divided over whether to treat environmental causes of conflict as a neglected element of traditional security concerns or as a completely different issue (Matthew, 1999).

2. The Direction of Causality

Some scholars note that environmental scarcity may actually be the result of conflict, rather than its cause (Gleditsch, 1998). According to this line of reasoning, conflicts engineered for political or economic reasons can have crucial environmental impacts, disrupting social order and economic life. These critics note that it is very difficult to tease out the individual role played by environmental factors in causing war and that current empirical research has failed to show that environmental scarcity is the cause rather than the result of conflict.

3. Empirical Evidence

Critics also cite the lack of conclusive empirical evidence for environmental security theories as a reason to doubt their validity. Much of the early work in the field focused on anecdotal examples rather than rigorous hypothesis testing. Later efforts by the Toronto Group attempted to address this grievance through multiple case studies, which suggest support for the theory. As noted below, the empirical evidence is decidedly mixed, with some studies (Hendrix & Glaser, 2007; Urdal, 2005) supporting claims that environmental factors increase the risk of armed conflict and others (Binningsbo, de Soysa, & Gleditsch, 2007; de Soysa, 2002) showing that the same factors actually reduce conflict risk. Indeed, many scholars remain concerned about the veracity of the Toronto Group’s claims, as methodological issues persist (Buhaug, Gleditsch, & Theisen, 2008; Gleditsch, 1998).

III. Applications and Empirical Evidence

Much of the debate over the role of the environment in causing conflict has focused on the empirical evidence supporting the claims of the Toronto Group. Numerous case studies provide evidence of links between environmental scarcity and conflict, but these studies are often plagued by methodological concerns (Gleditsch, 1998). Quantitative approaches are more recent and have had decidedly mixed results. Most recent studies have focused largely on the issue of population growth and density and their causal role in conflict, but the other types of conflict have also received their share of attention.

A. Environmental Scarcity and Conflicts of Simple Scarcity

Salehyan (2008) notes that “while environmental degradation is certainly not a necessary condition for armed conflict, neither is it a sufficient one” (p. 317). Indeed, there is little evidence supporting the role of environmental scarcity in creating simple scarcity conflicts despite the many cited examples of “resource wars.” The distinction is that while wars are frequently fought over nonrenewable resources, wars fought over the renewable resources that define environmental scarcity are much rarer. Scarce nonrenewables such as oil and coal are frequently fought over, probably because they are more easily transformed into state power than renewables are.

The only scarce renewable resource that appears to strongly contribute to conflicts is river water. When a dependent downstream country relies on an upstream country to keep the flow moving along, conflict can arise should the upstream country decide to limit supply in any way. Water scarcity issues play a particularly important role in Israel and peace efforts in the Middle East. The differences in socioeconomic conditions between Israelis and Palestinians are only exacerbated by unequal access to scarce water resources (Lowi, 1999). Water has also been used as a strategic tool. For example, to compel Syria to take action against Kurd separatists, Turkey threatened to restrict the flow of the Euphrates River. But some scholars note that although water can play a role in conflicts, it is difficult to pinpoint cases in which inequalities of water distribution were a key cause of conflict (Lonergan, 2001).

B. Environmental Scarcity and Conflicts of Group Identity and Insurgency

Most of the empirical studies of the connection between environmental scarcity and conflict focus on group-identity conflicts, particularly those that create social instability and lead to insurgencies. Anecdotal evidence is particularly strong in this area—proponents cite, for example, the high levels of migration from Bangladesh to India as a causal factor in conflicts in border Indian states. Likewise, political instability in China could be attributed to population pressures on limited arable land (Goldstone, 2001).

Hauge and Ellingsen (1998) conducted a study showing that land degradation, freshwater scarcity, population density, and deforestation have direct positive effects on the incidence of civil war. They isolated the role of environmental causes from other sociopolitical causes of conflict and found evidence in favor of environmental scarcity’s role in causing conflict. Attempts to replicate this study have been unsuccessful, however (Theisen, 2008). Tir and Diehl (2001) found a statistically significant connection between population growth and involvement in militarized interstate disputes. A study by Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004) found that the effect of unexpectedly low precipitation levels on national economic growth in countries of sub-Saharan Africa increased their risk of civil war. Other scholars have made similar findings, demonstrating a connection between increased water scarcity or changes in precipitation and conflict (Hendrix & Glaser, 2007; Raleigh & Urdal, 2007). The connection between population density and the likelihood of conflict has received particular attention. Scholars note that pure population growth does not capture the demand-side issue of scarcity unless density is also accounted for (de Soysa, 2002; Raleigh & Urdal, 2007; Urdal, 2005). However, some scholars have found that population density does not play a role (Tir & Diehl, 2001) and that resource wealth, rather than scarcity, is associated with an increased likelihood of conflict (Binningsbo et al., 2007).

Process tracing of numerous case studies also provides evidence for the role of environmental scarcity in provoking or exacerbating group conflict. Water issues in Gaza provoked tensions between Arab and Israeli settlers, and social turmoil in South Africa in the late 1980s can be partially attributed to unequal access to resources by Blacks and Whites (Kelly & Homer-Dixon, 1998; Percival & Homer-Dixon, 2001). In the Philippines, degradation of cropland and forests has exacerbated economic problems, and insurgency movements have been empowered by the poverty of agricultural workers operating in areas of weak central government. However, evidence in at least one case—the Rwandan genocide—shows that although environmental degradation and high population density were present, these factors did not play a major role in escalating conflict between Hutus and Tutsis (Percival & Homer- Dixon, 1998).

The empirical record for a generic connection between environmental scarcity and armed conflict is therefore decidedly mixed. As many critics have pointed out, existing efforts have failed to produce robust findings confirming that environmental factors play a role separate from other sociopolitical causes of conflict (Buhaug et al., 2008). However, the case studies and quantitative efforts do suggest that the hypotheses of the Toronto Group cannot be ignored and merit further study.

IV. Policy Implications

The empirical evidence does suggest that environmental scarcity can increase the likelihood of certain kinds of conflict. Policymakers eager to avoid these types of conflict can take several pieces of advice from scholars.

Homer-Dixon (1991) noted that there are two paths to avoiding conflicts posed by environmental scarcity. One possibility is to become a “hard” authoritarian regime, cracking down on any social unrest that results from resource scarcity or population pressures. A second option is to promote technical and social ingenuity (Homer- Dixon, 2002): Technical ingenuity can lead to more efficient uses of scarce resources, diminishing the need for conflict over their use and ownership, and social ingenuity can create an economy and a society that do not rely on the consumption of scarce resources to survive.

If all else fails, standard military reactions to conflict are available for outbreaks of violence caused by environmental scarcity. Butts (1999) notes that the U.S. military has extensive resources and skills that can easily be brought to bear on any conflicts that arise this way.

Environmental scarcity does pose a profound challenge to policymakers. Many policies that can lead to conflict via environmental changes are grounded in principles of economic development. For developing countries, for example, deforestation practices are designed not to destroy the environment or degrade agricultural land, but to provide fuel for the locals and lumber for trade. Indeed, practices viewed by wealthy, developed countries as degrading the environment are viewed by poorer, developing states as practical necessities for strong economic growth. It can be very difficult for policymakers to focus on the potential long-term implications of policies designed to produce short-term economic gains. Policymakers therefore must pay particular attention to the concerns of developing countries if they hope to mitigate the effects of environmental change on future conflicts.

Further challenges are posed by the nature of environmental problems. Political borders mean little to rivers, oceans, or the atmosphere. One state’s pollution can quickly become the problem of its neighbors and indeed the entire globe. For example, the greenhouse gases causing global warming are emitted by many states, but more than 40% of the total comes from the United States and China. These gases—and their effects on the warming of the globe and climate change—do not affect only the emitters, however. Their impact will be felt by every country on the planet, including those states that emit zero greenhouse gases. Collective action is required to address these causes of conflict. Therefore, as they craft international regimes promoting cooperation, policymakers should pay particular attention to designing regimes that can manage environmental causes of conflict.

V. Future Directions

Empirical testing of the Toronto Group’s hypotheses is still in the preliminary stages, and additional analysis is needed. In particular, scholars are beginning to pay close attention to isolating the environmental causes of conflict from more traditional political and economic factors (Hauge & Ellingsen, 2001). More research in this area in particular is needed to settle long-standing debates on whether environmental factors by themselves are likely to cause security problems and indeed whether environmental conflict should be treated similarly to more traditional sources of conflict.

As noted in the previous section, international collective action is frequently the key to addressing environmental issues. In recent years, scholarship has focused on the issue of the design of international regimes, paying close attention to how these regimes can be designed to promote cooperation and compliance (Koremenos, Lipson, & Snidal, 2001). Scholarship on environment and conflict could benefit from a closer look at this related discipline and draw new conclusions on how to minimize the environmental sources of inter- and intrastate conflict.

Finally, scholars are starting to question the Toronto Group’s assertion that climate change will be a minimal driver of conflict in the near future. Scientific assessment has accelerated the timetable by which the major effects of climate change will be felt, and the actions that policymakers take today can have a direct impact on the likelihood of conflict in the future. Many scholars have taken up the task of analyzing policy options that could mitigate the impact of climate change generally (Rabe, 2004), but few have focused their attention particularly on the security implications of climate change and how they might be avoided or alleviated. The recent explosion in work on climate change in general bodes well that this crucial issue will soon receive some much-deserved attention.

VI. Conclusion

This research paper introduced the role of environmental change and scarcity in causing conflict. The Toronto Group’s claim that environmental scarcity creates social changes that create a breeding ground for conflict led to a series of debates on where environmental issues fall along the traditional spectrum of security studies. Empirical evidence suggests that there is some support for the Toronto Group’s contentions; however, further analysis is needed, as is a better conception of the term environmental conflict. Recent developments in the study of the design of international institutions, however, provide hope that policymakers may be able to minimize the impact of environmental change as an instigator of conflict.

See also:

Bibliography:

  1. Binningsbo, H. M., de Soysa, I., & Gleditsch, N. P. (2007). Green giant or straw man? Environmental pressure and civil conflict. Population and Environment, 28(6), 337-353.
  2. Buhaug, H., Gleditsch, N. P., & Theisen, O. M. (2008). Climate change, the environment, and armed conflict. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston.
  3. Butts, K. H. (1999). The case for DOD involvement in environ mental security. In D. H. Deudney & R. A. Matthew (Eds.), Contested grounds: Security and conflict in the new environmental politics (pp. 109-126). Albany: SUNY Press.
  4. Choucri, N., & North, R. (1975). Nations in conflict. San Francisco: Freeman.
  5. de Soysa, I. (2002). Paradise is a bazaar? Greed, creed, and governance in civil war, 1989-1999. Journal of Peace Research, 39(4), 395-416.
  6. Deudney, D. H. (1990). The case against linking environmental degradation and national security. Millennium, 19(3), 461-476.
  7. Deudney, D. H. (1999). Environmental security: A critique. In D. H. Deudney & R. A. Matthew (Eds.), Contested grounds: Security and conflict in the new environmental politics (pp. 187-219). Albany: SUNY Press.
  8. Frederick, M. (1999). A realist’s conceptual definition of environmental security. In D. H. Deudney & R. A. Matthew (Eds.), Contested grounds: Security and conflict in the new environmental politics (pp. 91-108). Albany: SUNY Press.
  9. Gleditsch, N. P. (1998). Armed conflict and the environment: A critique of the literature. Journal of Peace Research, 35(3), 381-400.
  10. Goldstone, J. A. (2001). Demography, environment, and security. In P. F. Diehl & N. P. Gleditsch (Eds.), Environmental conflict (pp. 84-108). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
  11. Graeger, N. (1996). Environmental Security? Journal of Peace Research, 33(10), 109-116.
  12. Hauge, W., & Ellingsen, T. (1998). Beyond environmental scarcity: Casual pathways to conflict. Journal of Peace Research, 35(3), 299-317.
  13. Hauge, W., & Ellingsen, T. (2001). Causal pathways to conflict. In P. F. Diehl & N. P. Gleditsch (Eds.), Environmental conflict (pp. 36-57). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
  14. Hendrix, C. S., & Glaser, S. M. (2007). Trends and triggers: Climate change and civil conflict in sub Saharan Africa. Political Geography, 26(6), 695-715.
  15. Homer Dixon, T. F. (1991). On the threshold: Environmental changes as causes of acute conflict. International Security, 16(2), 76-116.
  16. Homer Dixon, T. F. (1998). Environment, scarcity, and violence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
  17. Homer Dixon, T. F. (2002). The ingenuity gap: Facing the economic, environmental and other challenges of an increasingly complex and unpredictable future. New York: Vintage.
  18. Jacobson, J. (1988). Environmental refugees: A yardstick of habitability. Washington, DC: Worldwatch Institute.
  19. Kakonen, J. (Ed.). (1994). Green security or militarized environment? Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth.
  20. Kaplan, R. (1994). The coming anarchy. The Atlantic Monthly, 273(2), 44-76.
  21. Kelly, K., & Homer Dixon, T. F. (1998). The case of Gaza. In T. Homer Dixon & J. Blitt (Eds.), Ecoviolence: Links among environment, population, and security (pp. 67-107). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
  22. Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., & Snidal, D. (Eds.). (2001). The rational design of international institutions [Special issue]. International Organization, 55(4), 761-1103.
  23. Levy, M. A. (1995). Is the environment a national security issue? International Security, 20(2), 35-62.
  24. Litfin, K. T. (Ed.). (1998). The greening of sovereignty in world politics. Cambridge: MIT Press.
  25. Lonergan, S. C. (2001). Water and conflict: Rhetoric and reality. In P. F. Diehl & N. P. Gleditsch (Eds.), Environmental conflict (pp. 109-124). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
  26. Lowi, M. R. (1999).Water and conflict in the Middle East and South Asia: Are environmental issues and security issues linked? Journal of Environment & Development, 8(4), 376-396.
  27. Malthus, T. (1798). An essay on the principle of population. London: John Murray.
  28. Matthew, R.A. (1999). Conclusion: Settling contested grounds. In D. H. Deudney & R. A. Matthew (Eds.), Contested grounds: Security and conflict in the new environmental politics (pp. 291-302). Albany: SUNY Press.
  29. Matthews, J. T. (1989). Redefining security. Foreign Affairs, 68(2), 162-177.
  30. Miguel, E., Satyanath, S., & Sergenti, E. (2004). Economic shocks and civil conflict: An instrumental variables approach. Journal of Political Economy, 112(4), 725-753.
  31. Percival, V., & Homer Dixon, T. F. (1998). The case of Rwanda. In T. Homer Dixon & J. Blitt (Eds.), Ecoviolence: Links among environment, population, and security (pp. 201-222). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
  32. Percival, V., & Homer Dixon, T. F. (2001). The case of South Africa. In P. F. Diehl & N. P. Gleditsch (Eds.), Environmental conflict (pp. 13-35). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
  33. Rabe, B. G. (2004). Statehouse and greenhouse: The emerging politics of American climate change policy. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
  34. Raleigh, C., & Urdal, H. (2007). Climate change, environmental degradation and armed conflict. Political Geography, 26(6), 674-694.
  35. Ronnfeldt, C. (1997). Three generations of environment and security research. Journal of Peace Research, 34(4), 473-482.
  36. Salehyan, I. (2008). From climate change to conflict? No consensus yet. Journal of Peace Research, 45(3), 315-326.
  37. Stern, N. (2006). Stern review on the economics of climate change. Retrieved January 5, 2014, from http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/sternreview_index.htm
  38. Theisen, O. M. (2008). Blood and soil? Resource scarcity and internal armed conflict revisited. Journal of Peace Research, 45(6), 801-818.
  39. Tir, J., & Diehl, P. F. (2001). Demographic pressure and interstate conflict. In P. F. Diehl & N. P. Gleditsch (Eds.), Environmental conflict (pp. 58-83). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
  40. Ullman, R. (1983). Redefining security. International Security, 8(1), 129-153.
  41. Urdal, H. (2005). People vs. Malthus: Population pressure, environmental degradation, and armed conflict revisited. Journal of Peace Research, 42(4), 417-434.
  42. Westing, A. H. (1992). Environmental refugees: A growing category of displaced persons. Environmental Conservation, 19(3), 201-207.

Free research papers are not written to satisfy your specific instructions. You can use our professional writing services to order a custom research paper on political science and get your high quality paper at affordable price.

Need a Custom Research Paper?