Critical Incidents Research Paper

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This research paper begins with a brief look at the traditional approach to critical incident management by individual law enforcement officers, placing particular emphasis on the recognition by the judiciary that special circumstances require special responses in the form of highly selective processes for selecting, instructing, and equipping the personnel tasked with these duties in an increasingly more violent and complex society. This research paper then describes how social and technological changes led to the development of the current approach to incident control and problem resolution. The authors also summarize the controversies coming from this approach which features small, well-trained, and well-disciplined groups working as a cohesive and coordinated unit without depleting the law enforcement agency’s ability to respond to more routine calls for police service. The paper describes projections for the future of critical incident management based on the direction, frequency, and magnitude of current trends. The authors conclude with recommendations for future operations.

Historical Patterns

Traditional methods of American law enforcement have centered on the beat cop making his rounds on foot and later in a motorized vehicle to take the appropriate action through his own initiative and limited resources. Backup assistance and radio calls to the station for advice were technically impossible until the relatively recent times of the middle twentieth century. Specialized response capabilities were initially limited to horse-mounted police officers and were improved later by the advent of the automobile and the “flying squads” of major city detective bureaus.

Labor unrest during the 1930s demonstrated the need for specialized police units possessing the means for immediate deployment, containment, and arrest capabilities to deal with unusual circumstances such as barricaded suspects, demonstrations, strikes, and other forms of unrest in a rapidly changing society.

In 1931 the National Commission on Law Observation and Enforcement, commonly referred to as the Wickersham Commission, had been charged with the responsibility of reporting on the enforcement of the Eighteenth Amendment (Prohibition). The Commission’s 14-volume series of reports probed deeply into the American criminal justice system to offer the causes and effects of the situation and to suggest possible ameliorative efforts (Bopp and Schultz 1972).

As police administrators recognized the need to maintain group integrity and cohesion for these critical incidents, specialized units were developed. Despite the assumption of elitism in the creation and maintenance of these units, the following shortcomings of specialized operations had already been identified by the Wickersham Commission:

  1. The selection process for most police appointments and assignments was often based on nepotism and favoritism.
  2. Training was irregular, inconsistent, and incomplete. As a result, a greater amount of force was used than what may have been necessary.
  3. No continuous and concerted effort was made in large departments to integrate these units with other sections of the police departments.
  4. Little research was conducted to find improvements to existing techniques and technology.
  5. Specific organizational orders were not developed to define the deployment procedures to be followed by specialized units, and the lines of authority, responsibility, accountability, and communications were obscure.

An Increase In Violence In A More Complex Society

From the middle and late 1960s and early 1970s to the present, social and technical factors worked to change the complexion of law enforcement in general and tactical policing in particular. First, the war in Vietnam and other conflicts resulted in a quantum increase in the number and variety of weapons available for law enforcement applications. Unfortunately, criminal elements throughout the world had (and continue to have) access to the same technology without the legal, social, and economic constraints endured by law enforcement agencies (Dobson and Payne 1982).

Second, America’s space exploration program and its by-products have also had an impact on the technology of law enforcement and criminality. Limited space for orbiting payloads resulted in smaller, more efficient radio communications systems. Landline call boxes and one-way radios in police cars were expanded to full two-way portable communications. Where law enforcement had traditionally been dependent on the unplanned and unrelated efforts of patrol officers acting individually, the improvement in communications allowed all involved law enforcement officers the opportunity to coordinate their efforts more effectively in surveillance, pursuits, high-risk warrant service, tactical operations, and other activities that optimally require several individuals to act as a unit.

Third, the frequency and magnitude of special threats increased beyond the imagination of the beat cop of a few decades ago. Regardless of the size of a law enforcement agency’s jurisdiction, it is extremely naive for a police administrator to ignore the possibility of extreme violence. History has already shown that these events are not limited by demographic and geographic factors.

Finally, the effects of technical sophistication were accelerated by the development of criminal groups from all points on the politicalphilosophical spectrum and a willingness to collaborate against a perceived common enemy, i.e., the “establishment.” What is particularly disturbing for law enforcement has been the realization that irrespective of their philosophies and ultimate goals, some of these groups share the commonalities of impressive armories of military weapons, the sophisticated training necessary to employ them, a proclivity for violence, and a total commitment to their causes. The multifaceted composition of the American populace suggests that even more dissident groups will develop.

Events such as the Watts Riot in 1965, the Texas Tower incident in 1966, and the Howard Johnson shootout in New Orleans in 1973 held several separate but interwoven ramifications for the conduct of future law enforcement operations. First, they demonstrated that law enforcement technology was not yet sufficient to deal with many current problems. No longer was military surplus equipment adequate or appropriate for domestic applications. The Texas Tower incident in particular established an awareness of the need for a more sophisticated approach to communications.

Second, these incidents also led to an awareness of the need for firm, effective crowd and traffic control. Considering how numerous people could have wandered into the field of fire in these commercial and residential areas during these critical incidents, a major factor in the successful resolution of the incident may be attributed to the fact that the responding officers were able to isolate the perpetrators and that they made considerable efforts to block traffic from the area.

Third, these events illustrated how the complexion of many types of crimes was changing. The availability of large-capacity firearms and the sometimes direct involvement of a great number of people, both as perpetrators and as victims, were examples of how criminal activity was evolving and how law enforcement was forced into modifying its approaches accordingly.

Fourth, alterations in criminal activity could also be seen by changes in overall strategies and specific tactics employed by the perpetrators. For the first time in the modern history of American law enforcement, responding police forces were confronted with perpetrators who were actually willing to die for their cause.

Fifth, where news coverage of these events had previously been limited to next-day reporting and analysis, technical advances in the news and entertainment media provided immediate and on-scene telecast capability. Critics of law enforcement were given a means to record and scrutinize the substance of what had occurred and how the responding police forces responded to the incident. Improved news media coverage fostered another phenomenon: religiously, philosophically, and politically differing groups such as the Symbionese Liberation Army, the Branch Davidians, and The Order often achieved public martyrdom among some segments of society for their actions.

Sixth, responding to critical incidents on an ad hoc basis led to a breakdown in the normal chain of command. Without this necessary element of organizational management, most of the officers who had been assigned respond to critical incidents simply were forced to standby until appropriate orders were received. However, during the Watts Riot a very small number of officers from the Metro Division of the Los Angeles Police Department immediately recognized the confused, overly cautious, and politically dictated approach displayed by the command staff. These officers had been assigned to the Division in part because of their long-established ability to exercise legitimate and purposeful initiative and because of their skill in employing aggressive patrol techniques. The officers recognized the threats and hazards of allowing the rioters to continue unchecked. Because these officers had often worked together as a cohesive unit, they were able to use an established principle of crowd control by identifying and removing the leaders of the riot, thus reducing the crowd to a collection of individuals without direction.

Finally, these incidents pointed to the need for law enforcement specialists who are trained to plan for and deal with unusual events as a coordinated unit without depleting the law enforcement agency’s personnel or ability to respond to routine calls for police service. Special circumstances require specialized preparation in terms of personnel selection, technology, training, and tactics. Under the guidelines of Downs v. United States (1975) and City of Winter Haven v. Allen (1991), a law enforcement agency could no longer assume that every member is prepared or equipped to perform any task on an ad hoc basis in response to this sort of increasingly complex and heinous criminal activity. This need has proved to be particularly true in large metropolitan areas where multiple calls for this type of police service have become commonplace. Specialized preparation revolves around an organization whereby all functions associated with these perplexing problems can be performed in an orderly fashion without disruption to the other elements of the overall law enforcement agency. The term organization implies more than a recognized position in an organizational chart. The term carries with it the implication that any specialized component possesses the appropriate authority and official means to perform any tasks for which it is responsible and that it receives the necessary administrative support to perform these tasks. Events such as the Munich massacre in 1972 demonstrated the same law enforcement shortcomings on an international basis (Mijares and Mijares 1994).

Present Trends In The Response To Critical Incidents

Over the past 40 years, police administrators have progressively relied upon the concept of rigorously selected personnel who have been trained and equipped with special weapons and tactics (SWAT) to respond to these incidents while allowing the uninterrupted ability to respond to more routine calls for service. Since its formative years the SWAT concept has increased dramatically from a small number of large urban police departments to an almost universal acknowledgement of the guidelines defined in Downs v. United States and City of Winter Haven v. Allen recognized that special circumstances require special responses. When law enforcement agencies were financially unable to develop a full-time, organizationally dedicated tactical response capability, part-time SWAT units and mutual assistance programs were developed (Perkins and Mijares 1994). Where officers were originally wearing military surplus fatigue uniforms and baseball caps, today’s operators don padded, fire- and ballistic- resistant, and slash-impervious protective gear and fiberglass helmets. Where the original tactical personnel were armed with revolvers and pump shotguns, present SWAT personnel may select from a wide array of weapons and other equipment. Where yesterday’s officers were trained only on localized barricaded suspect and crowd control scenarios, the currently available training classes are many and varied through the state, regional, and national tactical training associations.

Law enforcement managers and SWAT commanders have recognized that the future, as it relates to law enforcement’s obligation to be prepared to protect the citizens it serves, can be predicted. Economics and joblessness are commonly used predictors of crime in our society. Unpredictable calamities that are certain to take place, such as natural disasters, leave uncertainty as to the exact location, date, and time, but it is relatively certain that earthquakes will occur in California, tornados will occur in the Plains States, and floods will occur along the rivers. Accompanying these catastrophes and the damage they do is the predictable lawlessness on the part of some elements in society who see destruction of security, property, and chaos as opportunity to loot and assault. It is the mission of SWAT teams to provide a means for law enforcement to respond efficiently and effectively to all types of critical incidents in such a manner that routine calls for police service need not be ignored (Mijares and McCarthy 2008).

The changing culture in all countries introduces crimes at a level and intensity not seen before. Active shooters have become a real and very dangerous problem throughout the world. The tragedies at Columbine High School and at the Texas Tower are two early examples. Societies that believe they are culturally immune from this phenomenon are not. More recent example took place in Oslo, Norway, Virginia Tech University, and Aurora, Colorado. These latest attacks demonstrated how a single suspect can easily kill dozens of people. Thus, it is highly probable that mass murderers will continue to attack, especially where it is perceived that “It can’t happen here,” is a tenet of incompetent law enforcement managers and unrealistic politicians.

Terrorism driven by both religious fanaticism and political extremism and the forecast of mass murder and civil disturbances created by extreme ideology are happening and will most likely continue. International terrorist groups such as Al Queda and its affiliates have planned and accomplished large-scale attacks in major cities throughout the world, e.g., New York in 2001, Madrid in 2004, Mumbai in 2008, and Moscow in 2009. Terrorist communications have been intercepted that tell us they intend to hit smaller targets in locations that are less prepared. The intelligence gathered on these groups suggests that large cities must continue to build and refine their tactical response capabilities and smaller jurisdictions must catch up.

The Las Vegas Metro Police, Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, Los Angeles Police Department, and Orange County California Sheriff’s Department have created a response known as Multiple Assault Counter-Terrorism Action Capabilities (MACTAC). These very large and capable agencies have joined together and combined their resources and training to be able to deploy their SWAT teams and other assets immediately in the jurisdiction that is under attack. This tactic allows the city or county team that is initially on scene to expect that as deployment is initiated, three additional teams from large agencies are already on their way with tactics and techniques have been practiced and will be immediately utilized. Some smaller agencies have begun to emulate this model and regionalize their training, logistics, tactics, and communications, so they have the same type of response capability. The MACTAC concept is being introduced nationally.

A similar approach is being used in the area of gathering and analyzing intelligence in the law enforcement context. Usually described as “fusion centers,” this concept is the result of a joint project among elements of the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice and assigned personnel from state, county, regional, and local police departments. This approach involves the sharing of information on matters of mutual concern. Unlike the infamous “red squads” of a previous generation of law enforcement, fusion centers do not merely gather and store information but instead they analyze and disseminate it when verified and validated.

Civil disturbance is a serious threat at all times in our free and open society with the myriad special interests, cultures, and human greed that exist in a heterogeneous society. By comparison, Japan had very little uncivil behavior and virtually no looting during the latest natural disasters. When there is an “excuse” for a riot in an open society, there is no shortage of willing participants. The victory of a sports team, either college or professional, can elicit mass civil disturbance. A hurricane can be the “opportunity” for the unprincipled elements in our society to assault, steal, burn, and murder.

Law enforcement SWAT units must be ready and must train in joint exercises to protect those who cannot protect themselves and have a right to live in peace. Because of their high standards and advanced training, their organizational flexibility, and their disciplined approach to problem resolution, today’s SWAT teams have become much more than their original predecessors. They have become the operational first-response arm to thwart terrorism on the domestic front. Their ability to continue in this role is dependent on the perception of a threat by law enforcement leaders and elected officials. It is also dependent on a universal realization that the privacy rights and freedom of movement desired by all citizens in a free and open society also extend to those who would take them from us. Finally, it will depend on the resolve and ability of law enforcement personnel to balance the obligation to protect and serve with the constraints and privileges of the United States Constitution.

The SWAT concept of small units has not been without its criticism. Much of this reproach has focused around claims that there has been an overuse of military metaphors and intimidation, intraorganizational elitism, and allegations that the concept contradicts the community policing model, and that the overall approach is unnecessarily expensive and even counter-productive on the basis of cost-benefit analysis (Kraska and Kappeler 1997). However, these criticisms have been rejected on both methodological and substantive grounds that have led to inaccuracies in conclusions (Klein 2005).

Policing Critical Incidents In The Future

Past events and current trends can provide a reasonable projection of likely scenarios and conditions under which tactical operations will be conducted in the future. Like all other aspects of modern society, police operations in general and tactical operations in particular will be greatly affected by advances in technology. Equally important, changes in society, fluctuations in the economy, variations in political demands, and continuous modifications of legislation and judicial interpretations will also make an impact on the conduct of law enforcement policies and procedures. Unfortunately these advances are likely to benefit the criminal perpetrator as well as the law enforcement responders to criminal actions. Consequently, there is no shortage of problems likely to be encountered in the future.

Increased Encounters With Juveniles

A review of the Uniform Crime Reports over the past several years has shown a decrease in the crime rate among the adult population. However, a similar review would produce evidence that the tendency among juvenile offenders is the opposite. Accordingly, likelihood is high that there will be an increase in encounters with heavily armed juveniles by SWAT units both in terms of frequency and intensity.

A particularly disturbing aspect of this projection is the observed increase in acts of violence involving multiple victims perpetrated by juveniles against other juveniles. These acts have been manifested through schoolyard and theater shootings in various parts of the country. They have also been seen among the youthful participants in the fiercely competitive subculture of illegal drugs. Although these events appear to have been committed independently, a disturbing set of common characteristics has developed which may have important consequences for law enforcement in general and tactical operations in particular. First, the economic and social backgrounds of the perpetrators vary considerably. In addition, the geography of these incidents suggests that similar incidents can take place at any location. Where most young criminals surrendered to the superiority of responding police units in previous incidents, today’s youthful offenders often refuse to lay down their weapons and show no reluctance to stand fast in an escalation of the situation into full-scale armed combat with the police. Whether this tendency is the product of misguided juvenile feelings of invincibility and immortality or simply a reflection of rising overall societal violence, the police face a difficult dilemma. If the officers are forced into using fatal force against juvenile offenders, they will be characterized as overzealous and trigger-happy. If they approach a critical incident with the deliberation shown by first responders to the Columbine High School incident of 1997 when they attempted to subdue and arrest the perpetrators, they will be criticized for being too slow to respond and uncaring about the perpetrator’s victims. Irrespective of the action taken, the responding law enforcement personnel will be criticized more severely and from more directions than ever before.

Suicide By Cop

Suicide is hardly a new phenomenon. Various politicians, mental health professionals, and attorneys filing law suits against the police occasionally suggest that the police officers who confront suicidal suspects should use something besides deadly force to neutralize the situation. However, officers cannot be expected to accomplish immediate psychological evaluations and identify the mental and emotional problems leading to these suicidal incidents nor can they be expected to discover a solution to the perpetrator’s problems in a few minutes when psychologists and psychiatrists who have given several hours of clinical sessions to their patients spread out over several months cannot do so. Some professionals such as psychologists, attorneys, and academicians have suggested that the police should have the skills to deal with the suicidal individual. At least they suggest that the police should be able to call a mental health professional to the scene to be utilized in some way to prevent a negative outcome. However, the availability of such a resource simply does not exist for most police departments. What mental health professional is available on Saturday at 2:20 a.m.?

The law enforcement element of the criminal justice system, including well-trained tactical officers, may not be able to address the psychopathological needs of suicidal individuals in general or victim-precipitated shootings by police in particular. However, through training, education of the public, and continuous research, the impact of this phenomenon on law enforcement can be assuaged sufficiently to allow its etiology to identify appropriate remedial and preventative measures.

Terrorism And Police Involvement With Weapons Of Mass Destruction

In the absence of a formal declaration of war, most terrorist incidents that could be perpetrated within the borders of the United States are criminal acts. Although they may differ from the usual criminal acts in their gravity, the enormity of the criminal acts committed by these heinous offenders is so extraordinary that many citizens expect a military response or from a federal law enforcement agency. However, the response, particularly at the initial stage of the incident, will inevitably be performed by local law enforcement officers. Because of the magnitude of these events, a tactical unit will be directed to resolve the situation. Whether it is a mass homicide with firearms or a suicide bombing, the accelerated violence characteristic of a terrorist incident will require a response beyond the capability of a single officer or even group of individual officers. It will require the attention of a cohesive and coordinated unit. In addition, the extreme violence of terrorism is likely to be imitated and displayed by members of the illegal drug trade as well as by delusional individuals who have acquired the tools of the terrorists. Even without a political, social, or religious agenda, these individuals cannot be taken lightly by law enforcement.

Thus, it will become increasingly important for police officers to stay abreast of world events as to develop and hone their tactical skills. Where police officers may have relied solely on their respective intelligence units for information on criminals, tactical officers will need to stay more active in their pursuit of information.

Terrorist events could be catastrophic. Only with a coordinated and cooperative response can the situation be managed. If such an incident were actually to take place, direct involvement by SWAT personnel alone may be unlikely. Representatives from fire departments, public health agencies, hazardous material units, and explosive ordnance disposal squads would be called on to neutralize the threat and to relieve any effects. However, Hillman (1999) suggested that SWAT personnel will have specific roles to fulfill in order to allow these other units to complete their missions safely and expeditiously:

  1. They will accompany threat neutralization and medical treatment personnel into contaminated areas, particularly when there is a need to confront suspects and to control injured victims.
  2. They will provide security for these specialized personnel.
  3. They will provide much of the labor-intensive tasks of identifying, seizing, marking, and preserving physical evidence in such a manner that the custody and chain of evidence can be legally maintained for later criminal prosecution.
  4. They will assist with the evacuation of intended but unaffected victims. These individuals, though not necessarily symptomatic, may require quarantine procedures and may be in a highly agitated and irrational state. The demeanor, expertise, and methods employed by police personnel will be a major factor in maintaining relative calm and avoiding an intensification of the problem.

Changing Environments

During the formative years of the SWAT concept, most of the violent encounters were against barricaded suspects in homes or businesses. These encounters were usually the result of escalated family disputes or aborted robberies. While these trends continue today, there is a need for a tactical response in locations that historically were not just unthinkable, but were often regarded even by most criminals as sacrosanct. The shooting of 90 young people at a youth camp in Norway is a case in point. Whatever the motivation, first responders must become familiar with operating in environments and under conditions that are very different from the traditional residence and business place. This familiarization will involve not only differences in physical environments but also diversity in the motivations of perpetrators as well as the reactions by the victims. In most cases, the use of violence by criminals was primarily intended to be an aid for escape with an occasional outburst by an extremist crusader with an agenda. Based on statements made by captured perpetrators, each copycat use of violence appears to be an attempt to be even more grandiose than its predecessors and to leave a mark that will not be soon forgotten.

Crime As A Diversion

It is reasonable to assume that criminals and terrorists know and understand at least some of the basic requirements of a police tactical response. With this information it would also be reasonable to assume that terrorists or criminals would precede a major incident with a smaller but extraordinary event that would divert police assets to a geographical location within a jurisdiction that would make response to the primary event limited and very difficult. It is also prudent to train and familiarize other officers with at least a rudimentary ability to respond to further incidents when the primary tactical unit is already engaged. Officers assigned to the function of providing a holding action need not be permanently assigned SWAT personnel but could be taken from a list of officers who may have been selected for training and later permanent assignment to the unit.

Recommended Changes In Approaches To Critical Incident Resolution

Maintaining Standards For The Profession

A certain measure of creativity and modification are often expected and occasionally necessary for the resolution of the myriad of tactical problems expected to be encountered by a modern SWAT team. However, the actual execution of plans must stay within the parameters of the United States Constitution, existing legislation, current case law, department policy, and standards of the profession. Standards must be met in a variety of ways through organizational readiness (City of Winter Haven v. Allen 1991), personnel procedures (Moon v. Winfield 1973), equipment renovation and replacement, and tactical applications (Downs v. United States 1975), in order to be consistent with standards of the profession. It is incumbent upon all law enforcement personnel to stay abreast of these standards and in any changes in the state of the art.

Such information is readily available through several different media. Attending the conferences of the various national, regional, and state tactical officers associations provides current information on the development of new techniques as well as an opportunity to view demonstrations of innovations in the technology. Equally important, these conferences provide association members an opportunity to exchange case histories and opinions regarding approaches to be followed under similar circumstances. Printed articles in professional magazines such as Law Enforcement Technology, the Tactical Edge, and the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin furnish information on the newest developments in equipment and its most effective use. Academic journals such as Police Liability Review and Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice provide commentary on relevant and directly applicable court decisions and legislation. In short a large volume of substantive information is available for the active learner in this area.

Modifications In Approaches To Training

The anticipated problems plus unforeseen others that will certainly occur will require tactical units to incorporate a variety of innovative approaches to situational preparation. The types of problems anticipated to be encountered in the future by SWAT teams suggest that the resolution will frequently require more than one organization. The trends toward incidents of greater scale and which often cross jurisdictional lines will require the cooperative effort of several law enforcement agencies and support organizations. Some police departments automatically mobilize assistance from the local fire department and emergency medical services. However, the likelihood of incidents involving weapons of mass destruction will involve the responses from state and federal personnel.

Whether the support comes from within the organization or from external sources, the possession of individual skills and knowledge is insufficient without coordination of effort. Without the coordination coming from supervised joint training and participation in mock disaster drills, the effectiveness of any attempts to resolve these situations is very limited.

Conducting Continuous Research

Scientific research is an organized search for the truth involving problem identification, parameter definition, data collection and analysis, and the realization of a research decision. In the field of criminal justice in general and tactical operations in particular, applied research could address issues such as techniques, technology, and legal issues. While there may not be a legal requirement specifically mandating any form of research, the ability to display and document a continuous effort to find solutions for improving SWAT responses is certainly a helpful approach in promoting the image of any tactical unit and its management.

As an example, a tactical unit may wish to improve its ability to respond to barricaded suspect situations by examining the efficacy of various pieces of intelligence-gathering equipment or sensory-enhancing technology such as a thermal imaging surveillance system. The research decision would very likely involve a recommendation to conduct follow-up studies on the most effective techniques for using the equipment during a tactical scenario. It would likely also include a recommendation to conduct further research on the issues associated with the legal use of the equipment.


Extreme violence requiring a coordinated police response is a phenomenon with no foreseeable end. Most of the critical incidents requiring a tactical response are still committed by individual perpetrators as a result of either aborted criminal activity or personal psychological disturbances. Consequently tactical preparations in the form of training, equipment, and tactical responses continue to focus on the individual criminal.

However, a disturbing trend has been a growth in the number and strength of various well-organized domestic terrorist groups. Often using freedom of religion as a justification for their crimes and a self-serving brand of patriotism as a rallying cry, these groups seem to be particularly adept at attracting popular support by concentrating on their philosophy and ignoring their criminal activity.

Law enforcement management will continue to be responsible for protecting the peaceful majority of society from those who would use the available opportunity and technology to further their criminal motivations. Whether the criminal is an individual or a group, motivated by economic gain or political and religious philosophy, rational and calculating, or psychologically maladjusted is irrelevant. Law enforcement will continue to deal with these problems as they arise. The managers of police agencies will be required to anticipate these problems, develop proactive solutions, stay within a limited budget, and still provide routine services with minimal disruption. Of vital importance is the requirement that all of these tasks be done while staying within the guidelines of existing case law and legislation and protecting the agency and its employees from avoidable litigation.

The success of future police tactical operations during critical incidents will require active and supportive management. Success or failure will be highly dependent on how well management can assess agency and community needs through scientific research, provide relevant training for police personnel, utilize current and developing technology from many different fields, coordinate both internal and external activities toward the achievement of agency goals, and account for the entire organization with both objectivity and sensitivity.


  1. Bopp WJ, Schultz DO (1972) A short history of American law enforcement. Charles C. Thomas, Publisher, Ltd, Springfield
  2. City of Winter Haven v. Allen, 541 So.2d 128 (Fla. App. Dist. 1991) and 689 So.2d 968 (Fla. App. Dist.1991)
  3. Dobson C, Payne R (1982) The terrorists: their weapons, leaders, and tactics. Facts on File, New York
  4. Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990 (6th Cir.1975)
  5. Hillman M R (1999) Biological/chemical terrorism and SWAT response. The Tactical Edge 17(3)
  6. Klein G (2005) The militarization of the police? Or ten ways Dr. Kraska got it wrong. Police Forum (14, 5)
  7. Kraska P, Kappeler V (1997) Militarizing the American police: the rise and normalization of paramilitary units. Social Problems (44,1)
  8. Mijares T, McCarthy R (2008) The management of police specialized tactical units, 2nd edn. Charles C. Thomas, Publisher, Ltd, Springfield
  9. Mijares T, Mijares K (1994) The Munich massacre: its effects on law enforcement. Command, Summer Moon v. Winfield, 306 F. Supp. 843 (1973) and 383 F. Supp. 31 (1974)
  10. Perkins D, Mijares T (1994) Police liability issues associated with inter-agency mutual assistance pacts. Police Liability Review 8

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