Democratic Policing Research Paper

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The study of democratic policing might well be seen as the answer to the question “What are the police good for?” That is, what good are they expected to do in a democratic state? It surely cannot be dismissed by arguing that this required good is solely or even primarily that it must produce “crime control.” Police are a fundamental force in a democratic society in which in the course of their practice they are obligated, as the Patten Report states, to “perceive their job as the protection of human rights.” Furthermore, their obligation is collective and shared and cannot be judged in that sense by ad hoc criteria that reflect narrow interests and political positions. They reflect, at best, what is valued, or regulate social obligations we have to one another. The role of the police in democracy is variable over time and culture, not a constant. Police may enhance democracy by sustaining employment, security, and democratic procedures such as voting and demonstrations; they may decrease its viability by corrupt practices and collusion to destroy democratic competition; and, ideally, they may be models of decorum, propriety, and restraint. As a conservative force in general, of course, it is most likely that their role at best may be neutrality on behalf of the state. Why and how they contribute to these necessary functions has not been systematically addressed. Because such questions have not been raised in regard to stable democratic states, and the role of the police in nurturing democracy has rarely been explored, much preliminary ground work is needed. The primary impediment to serious scholarship is the addiction to the false idea that above all else police must “control” crime and be assessed by that toxic criterion. To discuss democratic policing, it is necessary to trace briefly the development of the field of police studies and its failures to address what is democratic about policing in a democracy. This will permit a definition of police, the identification of the features of Anglo-American policing, the application of criteria for democratic policing derived from the work of John Rawls, and the discussion of some issues requiring future research.

The Development Of The Field Of Police Studies

The systematic study of policing in North America began in the early part of the twentieth century as a result of the pioneering work of Raymond Fosdick, Bruce Smith, and later, Augustus Vollmer. They approached the topic as reformers, as students of law and public administration, and were pragmatic men of action. Later, O.W. Wilson, who approached the study of policing as a student of public administration, served as Commissioner of Police in Chicago. He later wrote the first book on police administration, thus inventing the term demarcating the field. It is generally accepted that the sociological study of policing was initiated by the fieldwork-based study of policing in Gary, Indiana, in the ‘50s by a University of Chicago graduate student, William Westley. Westley later published this study as Violence and the Police: A Sociological Study of Law, Custom and Morality (1971). Some 20 years after Westley’ s initial field work, the results of which were known as a result of a series of published brilliant papers, books written by social scientists Michael Banton, James Q. Wilson, Jerome Skolnick, and Arthur Niederhoffer set out the questions still shaping the field. They were in many ways looking at policing from the bottom, from the perspective of the patrol officer or constable. A book of lasting importance, the Democratic Policeman by George Berkeley (1969), was overlooked perhaps as a result of the growing concern in the late ‘60s with riots, disorder, and crime. This book, based on comparative analysis of policing in several European countries, was the first to address the principles of democracy that should ideally be reflected in police administration.

At this time, systematic social science addressed at least some of the lasting concerns of political philosophers from the time of Plato: What are the requirements for a fair, just, even-handed police? Who watches the watchers? From the Greeks onward, this question was couched implicitly at least in the context of democracy as a compelling system of governance. The question raised by Plato and Aristotle was again vibrant and commanding. Here, we encounter an oddity: as lasting as this concern has been, no tight definition of “democracy,” “police,” or “democratic policing” has been accepted. Political scientists, economists, and conservative apologists bypassed this thorny issue, and moved directly to impassioned advocacy of the idea. Here, policy and advocacy collide with empirical analysis and open-minded exploration of data. It has been known, for example, that some democratic policing practices can be found in nondemocratic societies, and that nondemocratic practices can be found in democracies, especially in times defined as crises. The assumption has been that police are neutral on behalf of the state, committed only to “law enforcement,” and loyal. In a stable, economically sound society, the following questions might be considered: Loyalty to what principles? Action on behalf of any government? Commitment to any law, regardless of its impact? Available in any crisis, including a revolution? Preserve and protect what? Whose rights, property, and vested interests? In many respects, policing grew within large European cities as a kind of order-maintaining force, a source of steady employment, and an unpretentious and often violent governmental resource.

In part, this blindness to the broader parameters of policing is due ironically to the success of the political efforts of Vollmer and his students between the two great world wars. They sought diligently to encourage and persuade the public to accept the police as a nascent profession based on science (social, biological, and chemical), carried out by well-educated officers and experts, and focused diligently and relentlessly on chasing and jailing criminals. “Crime” rose to the surface as the “problem” for which they were designed. Ironically, given his later infamy, J. Edgar Hoover was among the brilliant innovators who shaped most “professional policing” by lobbying for new federal laws, opposing corruption, developing a statistical capacity within the FBI, and tightening the administrative controls over agents. The standardized appearance, conservative suit, white shirt, dark tie, black shoes, and hat were no small part of his ingenious impression management. This leadership at the federal level was important as a symbolic brand and image for policing in general. As such, the organization argued successfully that they were deserving of respect, honor, and decent wages consistent with their skills and duties. This position was augmented some 30 years later by the US government’s creation of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), later to become the National Institute of Justice within the Justice Department, a source of research funding, technical information support to police departments, and expert knowledge. With the publication of the report of the President’s Crime Commission (PCC), several ideas emerged that were to have considerable influence and staying power over the coming years. The commission argued that the police, courts, prisons and jails, and probation and parole were not disparate competing units with diverse interests, training, aims, and tactics, but rather were part of an integrated, coherent, meaningful, and orderly criminal justice system. The assumption they made that it was just and produced justice was unchallenged. The commission viewed this “system” as flawed, but nevertheless it was created and implemented by just and honest people; it only required a bit of reform. It took a legal realist position that the system produced legal outcomes on a case by case basis. Since legal processes were the source of justice, the system produced justice of a sort. This system, they argued, had failed for lack of resources and needed an infusion of money, material, especially scientifically based technology, and personnel. The reformers hoped that this system could be reshaped by the application of science and technology, and they placed special emphasis on the role of technology in fighting crime. An entire volume of the final report was devoted to the imagined role of science and technology. This was social engineering applied to the problem of crime defined by officially sanctioned, gathered, and presented data. If reformed, they felt, this system could manage and control crime. Again, “crime” became the featured player in the drama. The report argued for enormous investment in human capital and technologies, and the government of the day was prepared to invest. Finally, the Commission viewed education and training as needed to provide “criminal justice professionals.” As a result of the report of the commission, legislators created federally funded colleges within several large state Universities that granted degrees in a new field called “criminal justice.” In due course, Ph.D. programs were begun, and the field of criminal justice, highlighted by the field of police studies, emerged.

Broadening The Scope Of The Field

The subsequent years saw a rise in officially recorded crime (ORC), protest, disorder, and rioting that in part were caused and exacerbated by violent police interventions in traffic, domestic disorder, and demonstrations. It was widely thought that policing was too soft, and the recommendations of the PCC and reforms of the Johnson and Nixon administration were failures. When later in the 1980s the concept of community policing arose as a panacea, its aims were local, parochial, and vague. They at best were tactical and adopted in spite of no evidence of their efficacy. It was not until the early 1990s that policing again emerged as a powerful force believed to serve, protect, and reduce the specter of crime. As a result of the claims of Commissioner Bratton of the New York City Police and a book written by his advisor and colleague George Kelling, a new view of policing emerged. The media validated the claim that “smart management” focused on arrests connected to “disorder” rationalized the process of crime control and resulted in reduced crime. Policing rode the headlines as a positive, rational scientific organization devoted to the general good. There was no question of its democratic qualities, procedures, or negative effects. This was to come later. In this media frenzy, the claims of the broken windows perspective and crime control were wedded and dominated research for almost 10 years. By the time that it was well established that the dip in crime could not be separated from other factors, including manipulating the standards for reporting, recording, and investigating crime, and the research revealed the empty claims of the broken windows perspective, the field had moved on to other concerns, other issues, and other sources of funding. There is no question that heavy concentration of officers in targeted areas can reduce crime in the short term of 6 months to a year, but this comes at costs in regard to staggering misdemeanor arrests, stops and jailing of minority youths, and questions of fairness and race profiling.

Concern with policing in the context of democracy and development began to escalate in the 1990s with mini-wars in the Balkans, the Middle East, and Somalia to which armed United Nations Forces responded. As David Bayley (2005, Bayley and Perito 2010) has argued, such low-intensity conflicts required policing of a new sort – policing that may serve as a model for other new nations; policing that is peace-keeping, somewhere between crime-based prevention and low-intensity conflicts; policing as an export commodity to be provided variously by cooperating nation states, private security companies such as Halliburton, Blackwater, and others; policing as a kind of nation-building instrumentality; policing as a basis for civic governance. Some claimed this was a moment of exporting a commodity, and policing was merely the next version of Coca-Cola and Mickey Mouse (Brogden and Nijhar 2005). These police-like operations were carried out experimentally in the sense that each new venture was undertaken by different nation states as suppliers of force; each economy and culture encountered was in uneven state of development; and there were no models for such operations. The closest analogy was not “peace-keeping,” but suppression of rebellions against colonial powers in Malaya, Palestine, Kenya, and earlier in Ireland. Furthermore, there was a sense in which the policing mission as it unfolded was open-ended. New innovations had to be developed to cope with unexpected contingencies. In addition, sociopolitical changes captured the imagination of scholars and refocused interest in policing and new forms of policing. These included the growth of the European Union and its cooperative policing arrangements, emergent police force; globalization of crime, especially drug-related crime, and regional policing responses to this in Latin America and the Caribbean; growing police cooperation around globally significant meetings and occasions such as international economic summits, Olympics, World Cup soccer matches, and large-scale rioting; and not of least importance, inexpensive networked communications; travel and the growth of global transnational corporations. The insular and parochial view of the United States, of the United Nations, international law, and international cooperation did not reduce the movement of “police peace-keeping”: the claim was that such activities were bringing democracy to the world via some new and malleable forms of policing.

Democratic Policing As A Problem Emerges

At about the same time scholars, including notably Professors Jerome Skolnick and David Bayley who were employed by the State Department, began to reflect, to consider, and reconsider the nature of “democratic policing.” It was a new enterprise insofar as the actions of policing preceded the concern for rationalizing and defining the concept. Since the early ‘70s, however, scholars such as David Bayley, David Sklansky, Tim Newburn and Trevor Jones, Clifford Shearing, Hsi Liang, and George Berkeley were characterizing democratic policing. They were focused on programmatic and prescriptive features, rather than empirical features that could be assessed. There was a new and an abiding concern with justice and democracy in the context of policing. There was also a growing awareness that past scholarship on policing had been restricted to anthropological, sociological, or historical studies of policing, often crime or order based, that had assumed the democratic nature of policing. The field of what was to become police studies was an odd amalgam of Anglo-American ideas, somehow connected to the idea that “policing” was essentially an invention of Sir Robert Peel.

This idea ignored several powerful ideas of great importance. Peel also invented the most powerful, vicious, and violent gendarmerie in Anglo-American society, the Peace Presentation Force, an Irish Constabulary that morphed into the RIC and RUC. This innovation gave rise to the varieties of policing, including the Garda, various state policing systems in Australia as well as the Australian Federal Police, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). As Sinclair (2006) has cogently argued, this was the model for all colonial policing throughout the British Empire. These forces had little concern with “prevention,” and they wrought destructive effects of colonial, postcolonial societies, and emerging nations. Finally, these gendarmerie-like forces had enormous and insidious effects on the differential means of police accountability that arose in the Anglo-American world. These were ignored in conventional treatments of “policing.” In summary, the assumption that “democratic policing” is unequivocally the case in North America obscured the varieties of policing that developed from the Peel model, the negative and powerful effects of this form of policing, and characterized nominally preventive policing mistakenly as the only consequence of his innovations. The textbook version of modern Anglo-American policing as a direct consequence of Peel’s ideas is misleading and partial.

Also unexamined, except in crude asides like the claim that it is obvious that the primary role of the police is to combat crime, is the matter of studying policing’s achievements beyond their struggles to manage crime. Criminologists have accepted the claims of the police and their professionalism and have focused largely on their crime management efforts. What else do they or can they do that might sustain or improve the quality of life in democratic societies? The prior question remains: why study police in a democratic context, or as a democratic institution? The police are one organization in a network of institutions that shape social life, such as religion, family, economy, education, and are but one mode of formal social control. They do not stand alone, nor can they control any aspect of social life unilaterally. They deal with failures; they are failure-processors who cope with the vagaries of other forms of social control. However, it is clear that they perform a variety of functions of significance. They increase the life chances and possibilities of the advantaged classes, the middle class and above, by overlooking, reducing, or cooperating to minimize their crimes; they increase the negatives that are lodged against the minorities, the poor, the disadvantaged of all sorts. This is the case, not because police are “racists,” elitists, unsympathetic, or incompetent; it is rather as Bittner (1970) says that they are designated to cope with and manage society’s difficulties, or its “dirty work” as Everett Hughes (1958) writes. Furthermore, police capacity to control crime is highly limited and reductions and rises are revealed in reports showing brief dips in official statistics. These are partial, misleading, and necessary. The mandate of the police in a democratic society cannot be reduced to crime control, although it remains central; their obligations extend well beyond this, and their role cannot be reduced to visible patrol functions.

To address the mandate, it is necessary to review events of the last 20 years. They suggest the following:

Crime in North America is declining, and there is no consensus on the explanation for this.
Policing is rising in status, in part because of the drop in crime and in part because its top command are articulate and well-educated. Their claims to professionalism have been validated.
Terrorism, globalization, and international police cooperation are increasing awareness of the isolation of American policing from international trends of cooperation, exchange of information and personnel, and increased and more systematic training.
High levels of immigration and migration within the United States make clear it is no longer an isolated island in the world.
There are concentrated levels of violence within ghettoized sections of large American cities, and inequality and poverty are rising to the highest levels in 50 years.
The drop in crime combined with increased inequality is inconsistent with conventional criminological theories.

These issues have brought to mind the need to reflect on the mandate of the police in the United States. The fads – community policing, broken windows policing, and policing as an export commodity – are exhausted, and the sponsored research field is quite dazed.

Police Defined And Policing As An Organization Outlined

The previous discussion of the putative functions of democratic policing assumes the need for a fairly precise definition. Unfortunately, most definitions of policing in Anglo-American societies are loose or misleading, as has been argued, insofar as they focus on crime control to the exclusion of other functions. Furthermore, this begs the questions of the negative consequences of reduced crime and/or the failure to carry out other functions. What indeed are the negative consequences of policing as it is represented currently? It is important that a definition contains their violence potential, the organized character of their practices, their local character, and their focus on order and ordering. Both public and private police exist and operate under the canopy of the law. Finally, police require compliance, within their organization and from citizens, and in a democracy this is essentially limited by the notion that civil rights are universal and procedural guarantees present. Ironically, as Egon Bittner has argued, police in Anglo-American societies are given an enormous range of freedom to deal with the unexpected matters arising and others matters they judge may escalate and cause even greater damage to the social fabric. Manning (2010: 68) has proposed this definition of policing:

Police organizations in Anglo-American societies, constituted of many diverse agencies, are authoritatively coordinated and legitimate. They stand ready to apply force up to and including fatal force in politically defined territories. They seek to sustain politically defined order and ordering via tracking, surveillance, and arrest. As such, they require compliance to command from lower personnel and citizens, and the ability to proceed by exception.

From this general definition, it is necessary to confine subsequent discussions to the public police. Private police are anomalous insofar as they are not paid to be fair. It is not a small matter that public police are permitted to proceed by exception because their mandate is elastic, negotiated, and local in large part. The mandate is the source of legitimacy and it is a kind of negotiated contract between the several publics they serve, not a reified single “public,” and their own definition of the nature of the work and its obligations. It therefore expands and contracts over time and changes in response to public demands and legal constraints. The mandate in a democracy is fraught with contradictions because of the various expectations of police – service, crime control, order management, control of traffic, and demonstrations – and the shifting scope of their practices. That is, the police in a democracy are subject to changes in public opinion, law, political decisions, and media, and their elasticity is essential. In part because of this the democratic police have been most successful when they have convinced the middle class “respectable public” that their primary role is to control or at least manage officially recorded crime. The crimes of concern are of course what might be called “decent nineteenth century street crime”: homicide, burglary, robbery, and assault. And in the late twentieth century, this includes policing “drugs.” In many respects, this is code word for the patrolling the life styles of the poor in large cities. In many respects, this is an impossible mandate because of the limits of official modes of crime control. In fact, public trust in the police and maintenance of the public trust are probably the most significant “product” of democratic police. They assess trustworthiness in others; they monitor sources of distrust, both in groups and individuals; they are a repository of trust by citizens in their symbolic expressive role. It is for this reason that corruption, crime, and self-serving actions of police are judged more harshly than the actions of other citizens. Finally, policing in Anglo-American societies is less violent and more restrained in spite of periodic eruptions and killings. This suggests at least a rethinking of the Bittnerian definition of policing (Brodeur 2010).

Eleven Features Of Anglo-American Policing

Given this definition and outline of the essential features of democratic policing, there still remains what might be called the constraining functions of democratic policing in any society. By stating the problem in this way, the scope of this discussion can be widened to include problems associated with the transformation of police systems to democratic modes of policing. Here is a brief list of proposed features (Manning 2010: 65–66) that can be used to judge police practices:

Police are a public entity and are accountable directly to the people.
Individual citizens, their demands, or requests cannot alone guide the organization because its obligations are collective and general, not individual. Callers are not “customers” or clients because they cannot choose to refuse the “service” or opt out of paying for it. There is no free market in police services.
Police cannot eschew their symbolic role as representatives of governance and governing. This is central to the belief in fair practice within a democracy.
Police violence is generally cautious and limited. Media amplification serves to confuse viewers and produce periodic crises in large cities.
Political territory of policing is problematic and cannot be restricted in advance to the limits of a legally defined territory. This ambiguity has increased as a result of international police cooperation; concerns about terrorism and its global dimensions and nonnational origins; policing under the guise of foreign aid and rapid inexpensive travel.
Police manage order: they do not produce it and may destroy it.
Police are not a neutral political force; they act on behalf of the state in crises.
Compliance with command and loyalty in the face of danger are essential to consistent policing, but they are always problematic.
Police are highly respected for carrying out dangerous work and given wide tolerance for their actions.
Police tracking and surveillance of citizens are increasing and largely unknown and unmonitored. This is concentrated in lower class areas and on lower class groups, but not restricted to them.

In summary of these considerations surrounding a definition of democratic policing, one can conclude the following. The police organization as presently constituted in Anglo-American societies has evolved historically and these patterns are reflected in the structure, function, and image of the police. The development of the role on the ground is a function of the emerging concern for managing risky situations that transcend in meaning the current on-view encounters and entail some form of risk management (Ericson and Haggerty 1997). In the police world, this means gathering “intelligence,” information gathered prior to an event, mining data bases, compiling records from other organizations such as insurance companies and schools, and developing even more forms of information gathering and analysis. This means that the organization has evolved a heavily loaded observational role for the patrol officer, granted a wide range of choice for the officer in the event, and has gathered the general support of tradition and courts for trust in the observational and intuitive skills of such officers. Variations in the pattern of sanctioning are a function of the sanctions available as well as the targets seen as sources of uncertainty. These are the shifting targets of police when they act proactively. As nation states develop, sources of conflicts move from local to national and transnational, and these require a kind of reasoned neutrality in practice that may violate local norms and expectations for conflict resolution. The police in a democracy are double coded as both the source of violence and a protection against it. This is complicated by transcendental rules and norms propagated by the nation state. Police are at the same time no longer obligated to kinsmen and their local norms and practices and obligated to other orders – feudal loyalty, state, or legal loyalty. If we think of policing as encoding uncertainty, that is, responding to what it implies for order, then the job is to render manageable uncertainty in terms of continuous procedures of some kind. This, in turn, engenders trust in the police. In addition, as historical studies suggest, continuity in the job as a full-time paid and responsible agent, associated with continuity of procedures, also implies continuity in the office or role and its functions. These functions are in modern times associated strongly with the Weber (1947) idea of a rational bureaucracy, even though functionally police are punishment centered, not rational-legal in their operation. The connection of public police with some form of accountability and direction in the interests of the “people” seems a tacit expectation of democratic police, but not of policing in general, nor policing in fact. This question of accountability raises another one – how do the police sustain their role as a neutral arbitrator of conflicts? In other ways, the police are transducers or means of converting one sort of fact into another; they process facts into information: facts placed within a context. In some sense, they must display authority whilst being rooted in the everyday lives of citizens. The police mediate and manage conflicts in terms inconsistent with the ways in which they are conceived by citizens.

These ideas are putative and descriptive; they do not say what is actually done, why, or for what reason. Let us now consider democratic policing more specifically.

Policing In Accord With The Difference Principle

It is necessary to step back from the historical development of police, the faddish nature of police studies, and the drive for police professionalism to ask what analytic principles might guide judgment of police practices. It is police practices, not public attitudes, “transparency,” or “accountability” that should command attention. Monitoring and legal constraints do not alone change police practices. The most important statement of political philosophy in this century is the work of John Rawls as found in his Theory of Justice (1970 TJ) and a condensed version of the argument entitled Justice as Fairness (2001 JF). These works presented two fundamental principles of justice. The first claims that all positions in general, and in this case the police, should be open to all on the basis of competition and the second claims that whatever passes for policy should be based on the difference principle. The difference principle can be summarized as stating that any implicit or explicit policy affecting extant inequalities should be to the benefit of the least-advantaged (JF: 42–43). Since it is unlikely that the police can actually reduce inequality, and in fact have no obligation to do so, a political philosophy with policing in mind and based on the justice as fairness idea requires some modification. One might argue that the justice as fairness principle in regard to policing should be refocused in a manner consistent with the Hippocratic Oath: the police should strive to minimize harm. The working version of this abstraction in regard to policing means that any action, planned stated, or enacted, should not increase inequalities. How can this grand working principle be grasped as a set of objectives or guide lines? Expectations of policing are questions of function: if the below principles or rules of thumb are observed, one might expect of (domestic) democratic policing that it function:

Constrained in dealing with citizens and fair in procedure. These dealings should entail a degree of civility in interactions and in police practices. This excludes under virtually all conditions, torture, mass detentions, “round ups” based on political beliefs, not behaviors, and lengthy suspensions of habeas corpus for citizens.
Largely reactive to citizens’ complaints – reticent rather than sporadic – and not given to frequent secret proactive interventions, crackdowns, sweeps, and militaristic “operations.”
Equal in its application of coercion to populations defined spatially and temporally. The level of coercion is based on minimalistic criteria, much as counter insurgency tactics, rather than a mechanistic “use of force continuum.”
Fair in hiring, internal evaluation, promotion and demotion, transfers, and disciplinary treatment of employees, officers, and civilians.
Competitive in an environment which includes private police, vigilante groups, posses, ad hoc policing under the guise of “self-help” and revenge. It may include the National Guard and the armed services (army, navy, coast guard, and the air force). This implies formal and informal modes of cooperation rather than unified and unrelenting actions.
Accountable and responsible for their actions individually and organizationally.

Finally, such broadly based ideas are inconsistent with the echoes of free market ideology that the police should be efficient, and effective. If efficient means the best usage of resources within the organization, it is clear that police use modest budgeting tools, are locked into invariant strategies (answering 911, random patrol, and investigating crime) and tactics (ways of delivering such services), and in fact have an open-ended remit with regard to overtime pay and resources whenever a crisis occurs. Add to this the facts that sick leave, disability, and days off are contractual, budgets are determined by nonmarket-based criteria, and not in the hands of police supervisory ranks. It is virtually impossible to fire a police officer short of criminal conviction. They cannot be efficient in the nature of the mandate. Effectiveness assumes a criterion against which functions and costs can be judged. If this is defined, for example, as the percentage of known crime for which police make arrests or charges, and rewards were made for more arrests, the consequences would be unacceptable in a democracy as being unfair in regard to risks to the less-advantaged classes given current laws and regulations.

Conclusion

Democratic policing is a concept in need of specification. Police studies throughout the twentieth century remained focused on American or at least Anglo-American police organizations. The onset of peace-keeping in low-intensity conflicts created some reflection on the nature of policing and its mandate and raised questions about the conventional concern for crime management as a paramount function. In this research paper, police organizations are defined and their features enumerated. These led us to examine the governing ideas of democratic policing. These are predicated on the Rawlsian theory of justice with emphasis upon the difference principle. Finally, a list of six expectations was outlined by which policing practices could be judged. Efficiency and effectiveness are not among them.

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