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Overview

The role of courts has evolved over time and the role of judges has adapted to match the changing role of courts. This research paper discusses the role of the judge as originally conceived in the context of the adversary system and how that role has adapted to meet the needs of high-volume and problem-solving courts. The paper ends with a discussion of the importance of procedural fairness and how it comports with the three roles of a judge discussed here: the umpire, the adjudicator, and the problem solver.

Fundamental Issues

.. .the way in which a judge conceives his judicial role is the most significant single factor in the whole decisional process. Kenneth Dolbeare

The role of courts has evolved over time and the role of judges has adapted to match the changing role of courts. Courts in the Common Law countries began using the adversary process, which shaped many of our expectations of what courts should be and therefore what judges should do. The adversary process with its emphasis on public trial is too slow and costly to be used to resolve the vast volume of ordinary cases, but it is still used for the “important” large-stakes cases as well as the “notorious” cases – mostly criminal cases with a large enough public interest to be covered in the news and perhaps televised. As case volume increased, a more streamlined and disposition-oriented process supplanted the adversary process for the ordinary cases. The role of the judge for these cases then becomes more of a decision-maker than umpire. The third stage of the evolution began relatively recently with the advent of the more treatment-oriented problem-solving court process and the consequent more active involvement of the judge as treatment team leader.

Henderson et al. (1984) identified three separate adjudication processes – procedural, decisional, and diagnostic – and noted that all three adjudicatory processes coexist and are used by contemporary courts in varying combinations. Flango and Clarke (2011) go a step further and suggest that court structures be modified to be more congruent with adjudication processes in use. It may be that the creation of different types of courts was an early attempt to separate the three functions – courts of general jurisdiction using the adversary process to resolve more serious cases, such as felonies; courts of limited jurisdiction using a more bureaucratic process to resolve the large volume of less serious cases, such as misdemeanors; and courts of special jurisdiction, such as juvenile courts, using a problem-solving adjudicatory process. In any event, different adjudication processes require different judicial attributes and skills – a confusion that becomes manifest when litigants come to court expecting an adversary process with an aloof judge and find themselves in a problem-solving court with an actively engaged judge.

This research paper begins with the “classic” conception of a court – the neutral, aloof “umpire” judge using an adversary process to resolve cases – and then proceeds to elaborate on the temperament and skills required of judges using the more disposition-oriented and problem-solving court processes. This research paper concludes by asking whether the new emphasis on procedural fairness can bridge the gap among the three roles.

The Umpire

The classic image of judge as neutral arbiter has its roots in the adversary system. The very conception of courts, and therefore the expectations we have of them, is derived from the adversary process, more particularly the criminal trial. Is the following image not what comes to mind when the word “court” is mentioned?

There is a definite image about every aspect of the trial even what the courtroom is supposed to be like; the jury sits in its box, the judge sits on his or her high bench in a robe with an American flag in the background, the witnesses come in and sit on the witness chair; they raise their right hands and swear; the lawyers and the defendant sit at tables facing the judge. The trial begins with elaborate voir dire – the meticulous process of selecting a jury. The lawyers battle and squabble, trying to stack the jury with people they feel will vote the way they want. The trial itself gets going with opening arguments and statements from the lawyers. The trial itself is long, tense, and full of excitement. The lawyers joust with each other. There is clever and dramatic cross-examination. Lawyers jump up and cry, “I object”;.. … .They end the trial with impassioned arguments. Then the judge instructs the jury, the jury retires to a locked room, and a spine-tingling period of waiting begins. Finally, the door opens, a hush comes over the crowd in the courtroom, and the jury comes in and announces its verdict. (Friedman 2004, p. 690)

This expectation of what a court is like, and what the role of the judge is, is derived much more from motion pictures and television programs than from court observations. These types of full-blown trials with all the trimmings do exist today, but for a very small percentage of cases. Yet this image provides the standard against which all courts are judged.

The adversary process assumes that there are two sides to the case – perhaps rooted in the medieval process of trial by combat (Strick 1977, p. 21). The core of the adversary system is the form of participation accorded to the parties. Lon Fuller (1960, p. 2) defines these as the “institutionally protected opportunity to present proofs and arguments for a decision in his favor.” The government in a criminal case asserts a claim which the defendant denies. Each side has the opportunity to present arguments in his or her favor. Logically, the requirement for the participant to be able to provide proofs and arguments requires a neutral arbiter before whom to present the arguments and a set of standards or laws so that the litigants know the basis upon which the decision will be made.

Accordingly, the role of the judge in the adversary process is to preside over the proceedings and maintain order. During a trial, the judge rules on whether any of the evidence the parties want to use is illegal or improper. If the trial is before a jury, the judge gives instructions about the law that applies to the case; if the trial is before the court, the judge determines the facts and decides the case. After the trial, bench, or jury, the judge metes out the sentence to the convicted. Note also the role of the judge in this idealized conception – a very passive umpire enforcing the procedural rules of the game. In the language of modern confirmation hearing, the judge role is a passive referee who just “calls balls and strikes” (Roberts 2005).

Adversary proceedings are especially important when contending parties are unequal in power, e.g., the government versus an individual. The need for an impartial forum to equalize the contending parties is paramount. Lieberman (1981, p. 169) notes that “for certain types of problems, an adversary system is inescapable” and for a society with a commitment to political freedom,

.. . putting the state to an extreme burden of proof and by guaranteeing defendants access to fiercely independent lawyers, we can in general prevent the state from imprisoning those whom it distrusts or fears.

For courts to be impartial, judges must be free to decide cases based upon the laws and facts of the case uninfluenced by either external pressures or internal preferences. Impartiality is impossible unless judges are independent – free from the external pressures of threats, intimidation, or fears of sanctions based upon the content of their decisions. In some places in the world, threats to impartiality can range from direct and drastic, such as threats on a judge’s life, to more subtle pressures, such as denial of salary increases, promotions, and staff or equipment needed to do the job.

Impartiality is also threatened to the extent that judges permit their personal conceptions of justice to enter into the decision-making equation rather than setting aside personal predispositions in deference to law as written. One object of law school is to socialize potential judges to defer to law rather than relying on their own conceptions of justice. This “precedent orientation” taught in law school makes judges feel bound by previous decisions made by other judges (Becker 1964). The role of the judge is to apply the law to different sets of facts raised in various cases and to rule accordingly. This “law applier” role is important to litigants because following precedent leads to consistency in decision-making, and therefore makes outcomes more predictable. About half of the judges responding to various questionnaires by different researchers consider themselves law appliers, implying that most cases can be decided by analogy to cases decided earlier (Flango et al. 1975, p. 285).

One way to safeguard judicial impartiality is the practice of rotating judges among judicial assignments – even among civil, criminal, and family law cases.

The Adjudicator

Role orientations are beliefs about “the kind of behavior proper for a judge” (Gibson 1978, p. 918). The role of the judge as umpire, primarily presiding over trials, gives way to reality for observers more familiar with the actual court processes. The criminal justice system would simply break down if most cases went to trial. According to the National Center for State Courts’ Court Statistics Project, there were over 21 (21.3) million criminal cases filed in state courts in 2008, and that is an undercount because of underreporting from some states. One look at these numbers confirms that a full-blown trial is not now, nor ever has been, a practical way to resolve most criminal cases – even most felonies. In 1976, only 7.6 % of criminal cases were resolved by trial, and that proportion has been declining steadily so that by 2008 that percentage dropped to 2 %. Trials are the last resort – the ultimate proceeding used when all other efforts at reaching an agreement have failed.

In most criminal cases, the prosecutor is the key de facto decision-maker because of the important role in screening cases in effect determines the resolution of most criminal cases. Prosecutors decide whether charges will be brought or dismissed, which charges will be brought, how many counts of each charge will be brought, and what will be offered in return for a guilty plea (Eisenstein 1973, p. 103; Blumberg 1967, p. 58). Plea agreements are how most cases are resolved now and have been since they replaced jury trials in the middle of the nineteenth century (Moley 1929, Chap. 7; Friedman 1993, p. 253; Fisher 2003). Before plea bargaining, most criminal cases were handled in summary fashion. Trials then did not resemble the full adversary process we expect today but were more “quick, slapdash” proceedings, where 12 people, impaneled without voir dire, sat for a series of “trials” (Friedman 2004, p. 692). Most defendants were not represented by counsel, there was little or no cross-examination and few objections, and the jury did not spend much time in deliberation.

The role of the judge in most criminal cases then is one of ratifying agreements reached between prosecutor and defense counsel. This is not a trivial function because it does provide a safeguard that the plea agreement was reached using a fair process, i.e., without coercion of the defendant.

If these aspects of a bureaucracy are true for state courts of general jurisdiction, they are even more applicable to courts of limited jurisdiction which resolve less serious, but more numerous, criminal offenses. Misdemeanor cases are now and have always been handled quickly and summarily without much technicality (Friedman 2004, p. 693). Approximately 80 % of criminal cases are misdemeanors, and most of them (more than 70 %) are handled by municipal judges, justices of the peace, or magistrates in courts of limited jurisdiction. (Even that 70 % is an underestimate because ten states plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico are unified and thus do not distinguish courts of general jurisdiction from courts of limited jurisdiction. Unified courts do, however, have a separate category of judge, e.g., associate judges, to handle misdemeanors and traffic cases.) In the sense that these lower criminal courts hear the bulk of criminal cases, including disorderly conduct, drunkenness, prostitution, petty theft, and simple assault cases, they are the courts with the most contact with offenders, and it is in these courts that the stereotype of “assembly line” justice was created (Feeley 1979). One Albany lawyer (Redlich 2007) describes in his blog the situation in the lower courts of New York:

The biggest problem with our court system is the volume of cases. The volume is so large that the courts have to rely on assembly line justice. It really is an assembly line. The police officer prepares the initial papers and files them with the clerk. The clerk gives the papers to the prosecutor who reviews them and discusses the case with the lawyer or the pro-se defendant. The papers then go back to the clerk, who then hands them to the judge. The judge calls the case. There’s a brief discussion at the bench. Then the papers go back to the clerk, who then processes the result (fine notice, schedule next date, etc.).

Think about this: If a court has 100 cases on for a particular session (a typical number for courts like Colonie, Guilderland, Albany, etc), and each case takes 15 minutes, that would take 25 hours. That’s not going to work. If each case takes only 5 minutes, it still takes 8 hours, so that’s still not going to work. Most courts end up at about 1-2 minutes per case. That’s assembly line justice.

These types of cases require facts to be established so that the law can be quickly applied. Sentences and financial penalties are limited so that dispositions can be expeditious (Henderson et al. 1984, p. 11). Glick (1971, pp. 30–34) divided this judicial role into two parts, which could be viewed as complementary sides of the same coin – the “adjudicator” who emphasized deciding cases and the “task performer” who emphasized processing litigation and maintaining smooth court operations. The “disposition-oriented” or “administrator” role of this judge is to skillfully apply judicial procedures to achieve the swift and consistent disposition of cases (Vines 1969; Ungs and Baas 1972). Clearing the docket then becomes very important, and the task becomes to process large number of individual cases, a more bureaucratic process not unfamiliar to the administrative agencies in the executive branch of government. Judges must decide large numbers of lower-stakes cases every day, rather than spending days or weeks making a decision in one case at trial, and so the procedures must be streamlined. Consequently, judges may take a more active role in all phases of case processing to move the case along while ensuring that the attorneys, many of whom may be court appointed, are devoting the proper attention to their clients. Judges simply cannot rely on parties to frame disputes. Overcrowded dockets and “overzealous litigants” lead judges to take a more “active, largely discretionary approach to pretrial case management” (Molot 2003, p. 29). Federal judges have described their involvement in pretrial management as “moderate” or “intensive,” including “holding pretrial conferences, setting pretrial schedules and trial dates, setting limits on discovery and ruling on motions” (Lande 2005). Boyum (1979) found that judges who emphasized the “administrator” role did indeed take a shorter amount of time, on average, to resolve their cases. Timely resolution is a positive outcome if it does not inhibit litigants from seeking information, including clarification and follow-up questions, or make them feel that their concerns are not taken seriously.

The Problem Solver

In 1984, then Chief Justice Warren Burger said:

The entire legal profession.. .has become so mesmerized with the stimulation of the courtroom contest that we tend to forget that we ought to be healers of conflicts. For many claims, trials by adversarial contest must in time go the way of the ancient trial by battle and blood. (Toohey 2010, p. 7)

Spurred by the perceived inadequacies of the adversary process, some legal leaders have promoted a more cooperative approach to dispute resolution. Particularly in family law, once a fertile source of trials, there have been calls to abandon adversarial proceedings “in favor of more informal approaches with the goal of encouraging parts to develop positive postdivorce co-parenting relationships” (Murphy 2010, p. 895).

Some types of cases, such as those involving juveniles, have never fit comfortably within the traditional law-court framework. Separate courts for juveniles were created first in Chicago in 1899 (Stevenson et al. 1996, pp. 5–6) and served as a model for the later development of specialized family courts, which have jurisdiction not only over juvenile cases but also of other cases affecting the family from divorce to domestic violence. More recent “problem-solving” courts originated from the efforts of “practical, creative, and intuitive judges and court personnel, grappling to find an alternative to revolving door justice, especially as dispensed to drug-addicted defendants” (Winick and Wexler 2003, p. 6). From the opening of the first drug court in Dade

County, Florida in 1989, drug courts spread rapidly based upon anecdotal reports of success in reducing recidivism, as well as the infusion of federal dollars (Berman and Feinblatt 2001, p. 23). By the end of 2009, there were 2,459 drug courts and an additional 1,189 problem-solving courts in the United States, including courts for DWI, mental health, domestic violence, truancy, child support, homeless, prostitution, reentry, and gambling (Huddleston and Marlowe 2011, p. 1). The conventional term “problem-solving courts” has passed into the language even though most are not separate courts but separate dockets or calendars of larger courts or divisions. In most instances, they involve a single judge handling a single type of case on a periodic schedule.

Problem-solving courts require judges to be more active, less formal, and personally engaged with each offender, and this personal involvement creates a tension with the traditional role of the judge as a detached, neutral arbiter. Indeed, Hanson (2002, p. 10) sees the problem-solving judge going beyond Becker’s “situation-oriented” judge by not only taking into account the impact of their decisions on the litigants and perhaps the public at large but by becoming a partner in the “therapeutic-oriented response” to ameliorate the underlying problems of litigants. This tension the “polar-opposite roles” provides the base for the charge that problem-solving judges need to become “social workers” or “therapists.” One New York Times article (Eaton and Kaufman 2005) summarized:

The judges often have an unusual amount of information about the people who appear before them. These people, who are often called clients, rather than defendants, can talk directly to the judges, rather than communicating through lawyers. And the judges monitor these defendants for months, even years, using a system of rewards and punishments, which can include jail time. Judges also receive training in their court’s specialty and may have a psychologist on the staff.

The collaborative nature of the problem-solving-court approach sometimes raises questions about the impartiality of the judge. For example, problem-solving judges need to praise and sanction defendants, rather than remain aloof, but this active engagement could create the perception that they are not impartial. Some may also consider collaboration in “staffings,” where the judge and treatment team meet in advance of hearings to discuss the offender’s progress in treatment and to reach consensus about rewards and sanctions to be in conflict with the judicial role.

The counter position, as presented in the commentary to the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, states that judges in problem-solving courts may be authorized by court rules to act in nontraditional ways. The new ABA Model Code states that a judge may “initiate, permit, or consider” ex parte communications expressly authorized by law, such as when serving on therapeutic or problem-solving courts. The collaborative decision-making process “does not violate the judge’s duty of independent judgment so long as the final decision rests with the judge” (Freeman-Wilson et al. 2001, p. 3). Judicial ethics do not require disengagement but impartiality, and so a judge may show concern about recovery, even celebrate the successes, but must be equally concerned about the progress of each offender.

Problem-solving courts have raised related issues about the proper judge’s role outside the courtroom and outside the context of dealing with an individual case. Judges presiding in drug courts and monitoring the progress of participants in those courts’ programs may be authorized and even encouraged to communicate directly with social workers, probation officers, and others outside the context of their usual judicial role as independent decision-makers on issues of fact and law. Furthermore, judges are in a good position to advocate for court reform in general because of their respected position in the community. Section 4(B) of the Canons of Judicial Ethics permits judges to act as educators (Freeman-Wilson et al. 2001, p. 13). This is especially important for judges in problem-solving courts who want to build public support for treatment-oriented programs. Often education involves Illustrations using success stories, which is ethical as long as confidentiality is not breached or specific individuals identified.

Procedural Fairness

Are there any attributes of judges that transcend the three roles mentioned above? In an essay on “What Makes a Good Judge?” Sir Gary Higginbottom (2011) notes that the attributes of a good judge include professional, personal, and administrative components. Professional attributes include knowledge of the law, legal analytic skills, “good judgment,” and intellectual concentration, whereas personal attributes include such qualities as integrity, objectivity, and temperament. Many other judges have provided summaries of the qualities of a good judge, and these usually include professional competence (legal abilities and intellect), integrity, and judicial temperament (neutral, decisive, respectful, and composed). Note that these qualities are ambiguous, amorphous, and hard to define.

Judges Burke and Leben (2007, p. 4) present a powerful case for the principles of “procedural fairness” as a construct to define the desirable qualities of a judge and to make them measurable.

Judges must be aware of the dissonance that exists between how they view the legal process and how the public before them views it. While judges should definitely continue to pay attention to creating fair outcomes, they should also tailor their actions, language, and responses to the public’s expectations of procedural fairness. By doing so, these judges will establish themselves as legitimate authorities; substantial research suggests that increased compliance with court orders and decreased recidivism by criminal offenders will result. Procedural fairness also will lessen the difference in how minority populations perceive and react to the courts.

Although the lists of characteristics are worded differently at times, the four key expectations of procedural fairness are:

Voice: The ability to participate in the case by expressing their viewpoint.
Neutrality: Consistently applied legal principles, unbiased decision-makers, and a “transparency” about how decisions are made.
Respectful treatment: Individuals are treated with dignity and their rights are obviously protected.
Trustworthy authorities: Authorities are benevolent, caring, and sincerely trying to help the litigants – this trust is garnered by listening to individuals and by explaining or justifying decisions that address the litigants’ needs (Burke and Leben).

These principles are laudable. The principle of neutrality, however, suggests that they were developed with the image of a traditional trial court in mind and are therefore most applicable to courts using the traditional process of procedural adjudication. Procedural fairness meshes very well with the umpire role of judges.

Procedural fairness would appear to be tailormade for the problem-solving courts as well, especially the principles of voice, respectful treatment, and trustworthiness. Clients often communicate with the judge directly rather than through an attorney, for example. Neutrality is more of a stumbling block in these courts, however. Problem-solving courts require judges to be more active, less formal, and personally engaged with each offender, and this personal involvement creates a tension with the traditional role of the judge as a detached, neutral arbiter. This collaborative venture means that problem-solving judges are not neutral – they are rooting that treatment succeeds. They need to praise and sanction defendants, rather than remain aloof, but this active engagement could create the perception that they are not impartial. Some may also consider collaboration in “staffings,” where the judge and treatment team meet in advance of hearings to discuss the offender’s progress in treatment and to reach consensus about rewards and sanctions, to be in conflict with the role of judge as umpire.

There is a way out of this dilemma; however, problem-solving methods could be used post-adjudication only. Especially in criminal cases with a substance abuse component, such as DWI cases, the full adversary process with all of its due process protections could be employed until guilt has been established. After guilt is established, problem-solving principles designed to prevent repeat offenses could be used to select the best sentencing options, whether they be therapeutic or punitive. If problem-solving processes were used primarily post-adjudication, procedural fairness is an amenable tool for problem-solving judges as well.

Procedural fairness principles are not compatible with the adjudicator role, however. When clearing the docket is the goal, processing large numbers of cases expeditiously is the key requirement. Consequently, judges must consider not only how to offer each client due process rights but how to do so and still resolve the cases quickly. Consequently, they must take a more proactive role in all phases of case processing. The point here is with that many cases to resolve in such a short time, can lower court judges really be expected to provide litigants with meaningful voice – the ability to participate in a case by expressing their viewpoint – and still keep ahead of their dockets? Is there time to express their caring to explain and justify their decisions? In sum, is procedural fairness possible in high-volume lower courts? Because judges have such short interactions with litigants in these high-volume courts, the way litigants are treated by court staff becomes more important. There is no reason why procedural fairness principles could not be employed by court staff as well as by judges. Court staff includes not only clerks but also security personnel, bailiffs, administrative staff, and any other staff members that interact with the public (Porter 2011).

This research paper has suggested that the various processes by which courts resolve cases today be acknowledged explicitly and matched with the judicial role most appropriate for each process. All judges need not have the “umpire” role as the dominant model, but it is the role most appropriate for the adversary process. Similarly, “adjudicators” with case processing abilities and talents are most appropriate for courts handling the large bulk of the cases, and “problem-solving judges” are most appropriate for treatment-oriented courts. The principles of procedural fairness can improve the sensitivity of all judges, especially trial judges, but are least applicable to judges sitting in high-volume courts. In those courts, it is particularly important that court staff adopt a procedural fairness approach to litigants by answering questions, even those that are poorly phrased; by providing information about court rules, procedures, and resources even though they cannot provide legal advice; and generally by treating litigants with respect.

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