National and Local Policing Research Paper

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This research paper considers the differing structures of policing particularly those pertaining to the Anglo-American and European policing tradition. It argues that both national and local experience of policing should be viewed as reflecting the differing purposes of the police within which protecting the state has preeminence within national systems and where protection of the community takes precedence within local policing arrangements. It looks in detail at the experience of national police in France and contrasts this with the policing traditions that have characterized the development of local policing in both America and the United Kingdom.

Key Controversies

There has been an ongoing debate among both practitioner and academic commentators as to the advantages and drawbacks of two competing models of police organization. It is fair to say that until recently, the commitment to local policing was one that very much reflected the Anglo-American approach to devolved police structures that were closely linked to systems of local government (Marshall 1965). On the other hand, the national and more centralized police model was linked to mainstream European models of policing where a highly centralized state exercised clear hegemony over national policing (Mawby 1990). Indeed, historically, the division between the two very different types of policing models may have also reflected a much more refined definition of what constituted the primary role of the police in different states (Stead quoted in Loveday 1999).

Thus within many states in Europe, traditionally the central role of the police was – and remains – the protection of the state. Certainly within France which has remained committed to national policing over many centuries, the police system as constituted in the late seventeenth century exhibited a “state protection responsibility” which over the years has remained a crucial function for the national police and the gendarmerie. The Ministry of the Interior and the Minister of Defense continue to exercise immediate responsibility for all policing in urban and rural areas within France (Mouhanna 2011).

Historically a very similar situation pertained in Spain where the public order function of the police gave it a paramilitary profile with state and public protection providing the overriding raison d’eˆtre for the paramilitary Guardia Civil (Mawby 1990).

In contrast, the Anglo-American approach was to place much more emphasis on local delivery, linked closely to local government (Mawby 1999). This system was to demonstrate its most extreme form in the United States where local policing was to prove to be, in its earliest manifestation, overwhelmingly local in terms of structure, recruitment, and direction (Conley 1995). But early nineteenth-century developments in policing in America only reflected to a greater degree the creation of the local policing system in the United Kingdom.

Following the Municipal Corporation Act of 1835 and the County and Borough Police Act of 1856, local authorities were encouraged [but not at this time required] to establish local police forces. The Municipal Corporations Act of 1835 led to the creation of municipal police forces based on local authority boundaries which were to survive until well into the mid-twentieth century. Locally financed and locally led, the municipal police were in effect under the direction and control of local Watch Committees made up primarily of locally elected councillors (Marshall 1965). In effect, outside London, the police system reflected a patchwork of local forces exercising duties that would be closely monitored by locally elected representatives [albeit based on a very limited franchise]. The primary point remains, however, that the “protection of the state” and centralized control of the police never appeared as a primary function or organizational characteristic of policing in either the UK or the US. Even in London where the Metropolitan Police was made accountable to the Home Secretary, there was to be little interference in policing which was made the immediate responsibility of the Metropolitan Police Commissioner (Marshall 1965).

In America the relationship between the local government and the police force was to prove to be even stronger both from the inception of the police in the early nineteenth century and later. Arguably this very close relationship was to provide the basis for later claims that the police were heavily politicized, a criticism that continues to be raised against local policing models today. It is fair to say that given the strength of local political engagement in America, it was always unlikely that any local public service could expect to evade the tentacles of local politics. Yet, as will be argued later, the development and professionalization of policing in both the US and UK was to create situations where police forces – particularly the bigger urban forces – exhibited a degree of professional autonomy that may have generated a significant democratic deficit (Marshall 1978).

Key Issues: National And Local Police Systems

While the historical background to the division of police models remains of interest, it is also the case that policing structures remain a matter of continuing concern to both public policy makers and chief police officials. This may be linked to either party political processes or the perception that structural change can be expected to improve police efficiency and effectiveness. Some current, and very contemporary, examples of this development can be identified within two distinct police jurisdictions.

In Scotland, for example, the decision has been made within the Scottish National Party that there are significant advantages to be gained from the amalgamation of the existing eight police forces to create one national police force for Scotland. Plans are now well advanced to initiate this major structural reform of policing which could provide a significant indicator of what benefits accrue from a “national police force” within mainland UK where traditionally local structures have been seen as a defense of policing. Interestingly one justification used by the Scottish assembly in defense of nationalization of the police has proved to be that other European states have embarked on a very similar pathway (Fyfe 2012). In Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Finland, the respective governments have recently decided to move from local to national police systems.

Indeed within the Netherlands, a country which in the past has challenged the European stereotype of centralized policing (Jones 1995; Mawby 1990), the political process has resulted in a decision to effectively scrap the local policing system which differentiated it from mainstream Europe. It has instead opted for the introduction of a national policing system. Based on a perception that a national police model would prove both more efficient and less costly, the myriad local police forces that characterized the Netherlands will form part of a national Netherlands police service. Interestingly, in both cases the primary consequence of the reforms planned for the police service will be a change in police governance away from local government to national government within which the single chief officer will be made either directly or indirectly accountable and answerable to a national assembly which could prove to be highly political.

Developments in both Scotland and the Netherlands provide a remarkable contrast on the other hand to developments in England and Wales. Here the Coalition government within the 2011 Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act intends to move to strengthen local police systems by radically reforming local police governance to provide much greater local accountability of the police to their local communities. The 2011 Police Reform Act represents the most significant recommitment on the part of national government to local policing and local police governance (Loveday 2012). To the extent that the current Coalition government in England and Wales remains committed to entrenching the local policing dimension, this policy development reflects a common law Anglo-American approach to policing which highlights local police delivery along with a corresponding commitment to “low” rather than “high” policing.

Indeed the division of policing into “high” and “low” policing styles has accurately reflected the differing approaches to policing responsibilities. Traditionally “high” policing was [and remains] closely associated with European systems where immediate police responsibilities centered upon the protection of the state. Within the Anglo-American approach far less importance is attached to state protection and far more is accorded to protecting the community. This may well reflect the common law basis upon which policing in England was established and upon which the “new” policing model of the early nineteenth century was based. Within the 1829

Act creating the London Metropolitan Police, the Home Secretary Robert Peel made much of the police being “citizens in uniform” and where it was an offense for a citizen not to assist a police officer in his duties if called upon to do so. While therefore the high policing model could remove the police from any immediate responsibility to the community, in contrast “low” policing aimed to cement the police system within the community.

International Perspectives: Typologies Of Policing

Typologies of policing have been expanded to include a range of policing systems which provide for a better comparative evaluation of the structure and effectiveness of those systems (Mawby 1990). While national and local police structures provide a description of police systems, there are a range of models that can be applied to current police jurisdictions and which go beyond this. One of the most useful typologies was developed by Stead in his influential study of the French police in the 1950s, which continues to have a ready application (Loveday 1999).

Stead was to develop three typologies of police systems which he classified as “fragmented,” “combined,” and “national centralized” police systems. In developing these typologies, Stead also provided in effect a heuristic device in approaching the analysis of policing systems. Thus, it might be argued that using these typologies, it is relatively easy to identify examples of each of the typologies developed by Stead. Traditionally the police systems of the USA and Britain would have been classified respectively as examples of fragmented and combined police systems: in the USA a large number of police forces operated in relative autonomy, whereas in the UK local and central government were made jointly responsible for the government of the police. Similarly France has traditionally been identified as a clear example of a national centralized police system fully established with the creation of the Police Nationale.

One evident feature of government of the police remains the degree to which a police force can be made accountable for what is does [or doesn’t do]. This is not an esoteric matter as accountability can be closely linked, as will be argued later, to issues surrounding police effectiveness and police efficiency. However, it might be noted that each typology identified by Stead demonstrates a different form of accountability. Thus, national systems are theoretically made accountable at national political level usually by way of ministerial responsibility to a national parliament of assembly. In France, for example, the Minister of the Interior has traditionally been identified as the senior minister responsible for the National Police. Similarly the Minister of Defence has immediate responsibility for the gendarmerie, responsible for all policing outside of the larger urban areas.

Within fragmented police systems, the accountability mechanism is in contrast much more local and diffuse. Here as in the USA police forces will be viewed as being immediately accountable to the local electorate. As if to reinforce this within some jurisdictions, both the police chief and the local mayor may stand for election (Loveday and Reid 2003). Here, as with many police forces in the USA, the police will be viewed as being immediately accountable to the local electorate, as the sheriff or chief officer of police may well be an elected official or may hold the office of chief officer which is the gift of the locally elected mayor (Loveday and Reid 2003). In between the national centralized and fragmented models of policing lies the “combined” system where a mix of local and central government is designed to maximize the accountability and responsiveness of the police to the public interest.

Yet it is also the case that each model policing and police system may not provide the degree of accountability which the public may see as being appropriate. National police systems may have been the responsibility of ministers who as in France have shown until recently a strong desire to protect police interests from effective scrutiny by the national assembly (Loveday 1999). On the other hand, local fragmented police systems as demonstrated in America can be subject to local partisan interests, a feature which as Conley notes can be seen as being a reflection of the early development of police forces in that country. Fragmented systems may also be susceptible to central-federal government interference particularly where local units of policing are resource poor and may require assistance from external police forces or federal agencies.

Within “combined” systems, the very division of responsibility between local and central government may over time have allowed for the exercise of power without responsibility by central government. Given the interesting lacuna which may surround each typology of policing, it may be of use to explore examples of each typology and following on from that attempt to assess the overall accountability and effectiveness of each model of policing.

A National Police System

The recent decision on the part of a number of European states which had earlier supported local policing models to move to integrated national police systems suggests that some evaluation of existing national police structures would be of some value. In relation to this the best example of a state-led and national centralized police system would be the National Police of France.

Certainly the French policing system has traditionally been cited as the most extreme form of centralized police activity in Europe, where the collective interests of the state have often appeared to have overshadowed the rights of citizens. Over the years observers have often concluded that given its origin and raison d’eˆtre, the national police has been more concerned with protecting the interest of the state than with the rights of the individual (Loveday 1999). However, the role of the national police may provide some evidence of the potential gains and hazards which may be associated with a national police system.

While allowance must be made for differing domestic political cultures, it is evident that the history of the national police is not one that appears to place high value on either local accountability or responsiveness to the community. In the late 1950s some evaluation of the role of the national police was to be made by one commentator who argued in relation to the National Police of France that it was “not too sweeping a judgement to say that the French police system could be more easily fitted than that of any other Western countries into the pattern of totalitarian government. The political activities and the building up of dossiers of persons unconnected with crime which form so large a part of the work of the police of totalitarian countries has been among the activities of the French police since the days of the first Napoleon” (Coatman 1959:77–8 quoted in Loveday 1999).

Moreover, along with the highly dirigiste nature of policing in France has gone a willing acceptance of a very wide discretion accorded to the police in the exercise of their powers. As has been noted elsewhere, for example, “The French police are allowed a latitude – license would not be too strong a word, in their dealings not only with suspected and arrested persons which is probably unique in Western democratic countries” (Coatman 1959:75 quoted in Loveday 1999).

Despite police reforms, it remains the case that the national police continue to have, for example, uninterrupted access to suspects for the first 48 h of their arrest and when suspects may be at their most vulnerable. Under the system of “garde a` vue,” suspects for this period are denied access to legal representation. Within local fragmented policing systems where the potential danger of police abuse of their authority may arise, similar police freedom has been drastically curtailed by way of either statute or rulings handed down from the higher courts.

The lack of effective accountability at either local or central government level has been evidenced over the years and not the least of these proved to be the policing of an Algerian protest march through Paris in October 1961 which was to lead to numerous fatalities among the many Algerian protestors (Rudorff 1970:55). There was never to be any kind of investigation as to how those fatalities at the hands of the police had arisen. This proved to be largely the result of a decision made by the Minister of the Interior at that time who also intervened to ensure that there was a blanket ban on any media coverage of the police attacks during the course of the protest march (Rudorff 1970).

Some of the worst examples of police abuse of their authority arose while under the leadership of Maurice Papon, chief of Paris police, at this time. One commentator provides an interesting insight into the potential dangers of overt politicization of the police and the threat this can present to the rule of law, which can arise in relation to national police systems. Reflecting on the police violence exhibited at this time and supported by the French government, Rudorff notes that “No matter what crimes were committed by the police for whose behaviour Papon was responsible, he was untouchable and even after the end of the Algerian war he remained in office always protected by the government, never disavowed and never out of favour” (Rudorff 1970:55).

Yet while the national policing system of France is often identified as a model of national policing, it has never been a unified national police system. This is because of the dual system of policing within which two central departments exercise separate responsibilities for the national police and the gendarmerie. Interestingly, as is also to be found within the Italian national police system, the division of responsibilities between the two police forces has led to continuing conflicts between them over time (Gleizal quoted in Loveday 1999). There may be some suspicion that institutionalized conflict has been a characteristic which may have been encouraged by political elites in both Italy and France, to undermine the autonomy of national police forces and limit their potential influence.

The level of institutional dysfunction exhibited within the French national police system was to be best evidenced in the Jobic affair in 1987 when officers of the gendarmerie arrested a very senior officer of the National Police in Paris (Guyomarch 1991). This arrest served only to exacerbate an already deep antipathy between the two national police forces which was to be reflected in a continuing lack of cooperation between them. Indeed, it is evident that rather than seeking to allay such tension, national politicians have at times exploited it to encourage greater police responsiveness. In 1987, for example, the Minister of Defence was to allow the gendarmerie to operate in plain clothes. In the early 1980s the national police was to be publicly humiliated by the decision of the then President Mitterand to transfer responsibility for his personal protection to the gendarmerie (Guyomarch 1991:325).

While the institutionalized tension between the two forces has retarded the development of any unified professional policing strategy, it may, ironically, have encouraged greater political accountability of both services. This in itself might be seen as no small achievement where in the recent past the police had become “too powerful to criticize and where national politicians feared their hostility and whose support had to be courted” (Rudorff 1970:47). While it may exhibit characteristics that are specific to that country, it is however evident that there are potential dangers which may arise from national police systems.

These would include the danger of overt politicization at a national level as the police are seen as an extension of government rather than being independent of it along with the danger of operational dysfunctionality as the police role and mission is potentially subsumed within the realm of national politics. In effect the primary function of the police is reinforced within this political environment and becomes “public protection and public order,” a role which in France has been clearly evidenced in the policing style of the Compagnies Re´publicaines de Se´curite´ [CRS]. The public order role which has traditionally fallen to national police systems as a primary function is indeed best demonstrated in France by the CRS.

As has been noted by one commentator, the mobile units of the CRS were created and placed under the explicit command of the Minister of the Interior. While these units had to deal with natural disasters [floods, forest fires], their primary function was to provide “a weapon against strikers, rioters and political demonstrations which got out of hand or were judged to be dangerous by governments which made increasing use of this force in political affairs” (Rudorff 1970:49). A highly confrontational policing style developed by both the CRS and elements of the police national came at the expense of alienating the public and also of developing any form of policing by consent. This is a traditional policing advantage pursued by local police forces, not least because of the real and potential benefits to increasing police effectiveness which this approach can encourage.

The potential problems generated in France by way of national policing have been recently addressed by Body-Gendrot. In her analysis of policing Paris, she notes that rather than giving citizens a sense of safety with community policing, for the CRS maintaining order during street demonstrations and pursuing organized crime have long been seen as the national police mission (Body-Gendrot 2012:84). The same commentator also finds that while the national police have over recent years pursued a strategy of “proximity policing,” police officers involved in this strategy are not “policing by consent or pursuing a public reassurance function” either. Rather they are merely required to be “visible,” and in problematic suburbs, there is often a glaring difference between “proximity policing” during daylight hours and more brutal methods used by police forces at night or during street demonstrations (Body-Gendrot 2012:85). Significantly, some commentators, such as Mouhanna (2011), have concluded that the apparently more militaristic gendarmerie in fact has traditionally had a stronger community orientation than the national police.

Moreover, as with any established professional policing model, most officers within the national police will not be available for public patrol work as they can be expected to be engaged in “intelligence or investigation work” analyzing “cyber-crimes, underworld and organised crime” (Body-Gendrot 2012:84). This commitment to specialization which may be encouraged within national police systems only provides further evidence that the larger the unit of policing, the more difficult it can become for the police organization to fulfill its most basic functions which engage it with the public and community (Loveday 1999). This is because the level and degree of specialization which is encouraged by the very number of police officers available siphons off police resources from the public domain to police professional priorities that may not be shared by the public. It is also the case that within the French National Police, a lack of leadership, the inertia of bureaucracy, and the limited accountability exhibited by the police together have served to weaken police efficiency.

It is interesting to note that in the absence of effective accountability, the national police remain committed, within the capital, to a more basic and highly political function. As BodyGendrot succinctly argues, as the core of Paris remains a defensible space with numerous official buildings, public and private mansions, palaces, and banks, the police are required to protect them as well as provide for the safety of state VIPs. She adds that “Whenever it is anticipated that disorders could occur a strong paramilitary police deployment is placed in charge and made responsible for law and order” (Body-Gendrot 2012:87).

Nor is the paramilitary response to disorder by the police national confined to Paris. Most recently in August 2012, in response to disturbances in Amiens in Northern France, the police were to use rubber bullets and teargas “which some residents considered excessive” (Chrisafis 2012). It appeared that the rioting was sparked by resentment over “spot” checks conducted on residents by the police and also on a highly negative relationship between the police and some sections of the local community.

In response, President Hollande was to state that his government would mobilize all of its resources to combat the violence and that his priority was “security.” It meant that the next budget would include “additional resources for both the gendarmerie and the police” (Chrisafis 2012). It is evident that in the situation that confronts the police in many French banlieues, increases in police resources alone are unlikely to resolve the underlying alienation experienced by many residents as a consequence of aggressive public order policing which remains the primary response and central characteristic of the national police.

Fundamentals: Local Policing

In contrast to national policing experience within the Anglo-American, police system has continued to emphasize the importance of local service and integration with the community. This is best exampled within America where there is a continuing commitment to a wide range and variety of police agencies which operate within it. Most recently, the total number of police agencies in America has been estimated to stand at just below 20,000. However, the very number of local agencies suggests that America continues to provide the best example of a fragmented police system. While the long-term goal of many police professionals may have been to consolidate smaller police agencies, the evidence from larger police departments suggests that these continue to experience greatest difficulty in sustaining public police patrol. It has also proved difficult to persuade local residents of the value of relinquishing their own local police department in the interest of any perceived future gain in police efficiency.

As was to be argued over 40 years ago in what proved to be the most revealing study and analysis of policing in America, the President’s Commission on Crime found that the community service function of the police could not be underestimated (The Challenge of Crime 1967). This was because analysis of the role of the police highlighted how dependent they remained on information given to them by the public. In its evaluation of the investigation function, the evidence of such dependence was stark. Thus, in its analysis of crimes reported in Los Angeles in 1966, it was to discover that “where the police were furnished a suspect’s name then the case was very likely to be resolved.” It noted however that in “1,375 crimes where no suspect was named only 181 cases were cleared by the police,” and that in the LAPD one of the largest police departments in America, of all reported serious crimes against property recorded by the department, “78 % were never solved” (The Challenge of Crime 1967:97).

All the evidence indicated that a primary indicator of police effectiveness was the degree to which the police enjoyed the support and confidence of the public. This was because police dependence on the public for information was the primary driver of most crime case clear-up. Nor was it evident that increased expenditure on police specialization could necessarily be expected to impact on the crime rate or the clearance rate. The Commission discovered that in “practically every department the caseloads carried by detectives were too heavy to allow them to follow up thoroughly more than a small percentage of cases assigned to them” (The Challenge of Crime 1967:96).

In this situation increased further investment in the detective specialism, however large, would be unlikely to significantly increase the clear-up rate. It concluded that in the great majority of cases, personal identification by a victim or witness remained the only clue to the identity of the criminal (The Challenge of Crime 1967:97). Thus, the critical issue became one of encouraging victims and members of the public to come forward to help the police resolve cases.

The landmark 1967 report remains the bedrock for any evaluation of police effectiveness, and its central discovery of police dependence on the public it serves continues to have an immediate relevance to any contemporary debate over the organizational structure of policing and policing systems. This is because the evidence suggests that where the police are removed from regular contact with the public and cease to be integrated into the community the police ostensibly serve, then the decline in police efficiency and effectiveness can be expected to be quite dramatic. This may be measured in fact by the level of non-reporting of crime by the public who fail to report incidents because they believe the police cannot or will not do anything about it (The Challenge of Crime 1967:96).

This may indeed have been the overall experience in the UK as a consequence of the major police amalgamation program embarked upon in the 1960s and early 1970s. Bigger police departments ended in the creation of bigger police bureaucracies and much greater specialization all of which came at the expense of contact with the public by way of visible police patrol (Loveday 1999). Experience of the growth of police departments in the UK provided clear support for the inverse relationship identified by Monkennon in the 1980s that existed between police size and effectiveness. He noted how as police departments grew in size police patrol activity could thereafter be expected to decline (Monkennon cited in Loveday 1999).

Devolving Police Services In Centralized Systems

It is interesting to note that within France, one of the most centralized police systems in Europe, there has been growing recognition of the need for local police service delivery and evident failure of the national police model. Ironically while representatives of Anglo-American policing have highlighted its benefits, the French have implemented change at a local level which has significantly strengthened local poling in many towns and cities in France.

This can be traced back to the early 1980s with the interesting discovery that under the Law of 1884 passed by the national assembly, the mayor was given responsibility for public order in his commune (Journes 1993 cited in Loveday 1999). Under the 1884 Law, the mayor was given responsibility for the appointment of all municipal employees including police constables and inspectors, although this responsibility is balanced by the authority of the prefect who has a greater role in the recruitment of police in towns with over 40,000 residents. Thus, from the early 1980s in response to the perceived failure of the national police to provide effective policing, particularly in relation to responding to crime and delinquency and the decline in public police patrol, there has been a steady increase in the number of municipal police forces in many French towns and cities. In 1986, it was estimated that 530 municipal police forces were in existence, and that of these, 107 competed with the national police in terms of duties and responsibilities (Guyomarch 1991:331). In 1993 it was computed that there were some 10,000 municipal police officers who worked in 2,860 localities.

This interesting development remains a continuing phenomenon in response primarily to the failure of the national police organization to deliver effective police services. One consequence of this has been the decision of an increasing number of local mayors to establish their own police forces where the police are made directly accountable to the mayor. In effect the vacuum created by the withdrawal of the national police from visible policing has led to the creation of a policing system that is closely allied to the local government structure.

It is, however, evident that in France the future expansion of municipal policing may be influenced by the political position adopted by police unions on what they may understandably view as a threat to their role and status. In relation to this it is interesting to note that as identified by Body-Gendrot, one of the factors explaining the current malaise of policing in France is “a general lack of leadership to confront police unions’ resistance to necessary change” (Body-Gendrot 2012:85). Yet in relation to this, it might be relevant to note that in terms of devolved policing, the experience of post-Franco Spain has demonstrated a similar movement to devolved policing with the creation of municipal police forces which in most towns and cities now act as an integral element to local municipal administration. With this has gone the part demilitarization of the Guardia Civil and closer engagement by it with local communities.

The realignment of policing with local government has also been demonstrated in England and Wales. Following the introduction of local partnership arrangements under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, police forces now have a shared responsibility with the local authority to reduce crime within their areas. Formal arrangements under the 1998 Act mean that the local authority and other local partners are required to develop on an annual basis a strategy to reduce crime in their area. The strategy document is preceded by a local audit of crime and criminal damage and since the introduction of the 1998 Act has served to provide a far more comprehensive picture of the extent and nature of criminal activity than existed before.

The same legislation requires the partnership to consult with the local community about what should be the local strategic priorities before determining what they will be. Interestingly in this context has been the discovery that one of the highest priorities identified by the public is not in fact crime but antisocial behavior [ASB]. This has proved to have been [and remains] a significant factor in sustaining high rates of “fear of crime” in England and Wales despite the near-record fall in recorded crime. It is also evident that although ASB has long been a matter of concern to many residents, it was not one that, unfortunately, appeared to be shared by the police (Loveday 2012). Over the period of the partnership, one primary objective has been to realign police priorities with community priorities where in the past a commitment to a professional policing approach has often created a lacuna that has put local communities at risk.

Experience in England and Wales suggests that there is much to be gained from establishing close links between the police and the local authority. This is because while the police may be able to identify problems that may generate crime and disorder, unlike the local authority, they do not have the resources to respond to them. In an era of significant reductions in public spending, it is of interest to note in this context that in England and Wales, the Coalition government remains committed to increasing local accountability of the police by way of directly elected police and Crime Commissioners [PCCs].

While there may some argument over the mechanism surrounding the planned PCCs, created to achieve this, there can be little dispute about the principle that drives this reform which is to ensure that communities are in future better able to influence what kind of police service is locally delivered. To encourage greater public engagement, all police forces are now required to provide communities with local crime maps to enable them to make a more-informed judgement about how effective the local police force is proving to be in relation to the incidence of crime and disorder in their area.

Moreover, to assist local police forces in achieving greater responsiveness to local demand, the Coalition government is also in the process of establishing a National Crime Agency that can be expected to relieve local police forces from responding to serious, organized crime and terrorism as this new body is given a much higher status and role than has been accorded before to “national” agencies in the past.

Future Directions

The evidence from experience suggests that “local” policing only becomes meaningful when it is linked closely to local government structures. Moreover, even where local policing is in operation, there will be a continuing requirement for a national arm of policing to respond to the challenges of international crime and the terrorist threat. This is perhaps best evidenced in America where despite a plethora of local police departments, there are numerous federal agencies that exercise considerable power domestically. This federal responsibility cannot be ignored and has been substantially increased with the Patriot Act and the creation of the Department for Homeland Security [DHS] which now employs around 200,000 personnel and has a budget of $98.8 billion.

As in England and Wales the commitment to local policing is underpinned by a significant role accorded to national or federal agencies and reflects a reality that in the contemporary world there is a role for both local and national police capabilities and that neither can be expected to operate in isolation from the other. As the national police structures roll out in the Netherlands, Scandinavia, and Scotland, it will be of interest to discover how successful reliance on a single national force proves to be. Already in the Netherlands, local mayors are challenging the surrender of their responsibilities for the police and their removal to a national forum at The Hague.

In Scotland the argument for the introduction of a national force has been in part predicated on the need to protect existing police establishment [17,234 officers] by saving on overheads generated by the current eight forces (Fyfe 2012). Unfortunately no activity analysis of policing has been undertaken to assess whether current police establishment can be justified. In its absence the highly political nature of the Scottish governments’ reform program becomes more apparent.

While local police commands will be aligned with Scotland’s 32 local councils, it is noticeable that there will be limited influence accorded to the local council in the determination of policing priorities identified by the local police commander. Nor will the “partnership structure” developed in England and Wales be replicated in Scotland. It is also of some interest that in a public consultation on options for police reform, undertaken in 2011, less than 10 % of respondents supported the national police option, with most respondents preferring, in fact, a regional structure (Fyfe 2012).

In this analysis of types of policing structures, it is evident that national and local policing cannot be addressed in terms of simple alternatives. Within most advanced states, there is a perceived need for a mix of police structures which can respond to differing demands and challenges at differing levels. The degree of interdependence might be best evidenced in America where a continuing and strong commitment to local policing and community engagement is balanced by significant responsibilities given to an increasingly important federal arm.

It is also clear that national political cultures are significant in determining both domestic police structure and public expectation of policing styles. This of course is reinforced by the significance of the political context within which policing is delivered. The highly dirigiste approach to policing exhibited in France is replicated to a high degree in the Russian Federation where there may also be lower public concern about potential abuse by police of their authority and a greater indifference to the importance of legal procedures. These may, in fact, be seen by the public as impeding the work of the police (Kelly 2005:xxix).

It is also evident that as with many other areas of public service delivery there is very little evaluation of how police structures might impact on performance and general service delivery. Nor has any effective analysis has undertaken to demonstrate with any clarity whether in moving from local to national police systems the long-term cost savings which are claimed in defense of it are ever actually achieved. Additionally such savings may come at the expense of reducing public satisfaction with the police by encouraging specialization and reducing visible policing. As a result, it might then be concluded that any immediate financial savings could be more than outweighed by significant costs to police service delivery to the public.

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