Reentry Courts Research Paper - Research Paper Examples

This sample Reentry Courts Research Paper is published for educational and informational purposes only. If you need help writing your assignment, please use our research paper writing service and buy a paper on any topic at affordable price. Also check our tips on how to write a research paper, see the lists of criminal justice research paper topics, and browse research paper examples.

Reentry courts are specialized courts that help reduce recidivism and improve public safety through the use of judicial oversight to apply graduated sanctions and positive reinforcement, to marshal resources to support the prisoner’s reintegration, and to promote positive behavior by the returning prisoners (Bureau of Justice Assistance 2010).” An estimated 26 reentry courts and 29 reentry drug courts were in operation as of December 31, 2009 (Huddleston and Marlowe 2011). These courts are intended to address the critical needs of returning prisoners – particularly in the period immediately following release – through the combination of judicial oversight and a collaborative case management process. Reentry courts take many forms, with substantial variation along key dimensions of program design, including the mechanism for jurisdictional authority, target population, whether the court is a standalone model or combined with a drug court, and the point of entry into the program. Because the reentry court model remains a relatively new innovation, very few outcome evaluations have been conducted to provide evidence supporting its effectiveness. Preliminary results from the evaluation of the Harlem Parole Reentry Court are promising; however, additional rigorous evaluation is needed.

Reentry courts are “specialized courts that help reduce recidivism and improve public safety through the use of judicial oversight to apply graduated sanctions and positive reinforcement, to marshal resources to support the prisoner’s reintegration, and to promote positive behavior by the returning prisoners (Bureau of Justice Assistance 2010).” These courts are intended to address the critical needs of returning prisoners – particularly in the period immediately following release – through the combination of judicial oversight and a collaborative case management process. The underlying goal of reentry courts is to establish a seamless system of offender accountability and support services throughout the reentry process (Bureau of Justice Assistance 2010). For such a system to be “seamless” requires cooperation between corrections and courts, representing a new form of jurisprudence characterized by these agencies working in partnership in pursuit of the common goal of successful offender reintegration (Wilkinson et al. 2004).

Reentry courts originated as a new strategy for managing prisoner reentry, as policymakers contemplated large numbers of returning prisoners and the myriad problems associated with reintegration. These large numbers were the results of changes in incarceration rates, which, after remaining relatively stable from 1925 to 1973, began to increase steadily starting in 1973 (Travis and Petersilia 2001). Over the next 30 and more years, incarceration rates and prison populations increased dramatically, with the growth only beginning to slow in 2006 (West et al. 2010). By the end of 2009 (the most recent year for which data are available), the number of prisoners under state or federal jurisdiction was just over 1.6 million (West et al. 2010). Because nearly all prisoners are released (West et al. 2010), high incarceration rates result in large numbers of returning prisoners each year. Each year since 2005, more than 700,000 prisoners have been released from federal or state prisons. In 2009, 729,295 sentenced prisoners were released from state or federal jurisdiction (West et al. 2010). This number represented the first decline in the number of prison releases since 2000 (West et al. 2010).

The sheer volume of returning prisoners and the overwhelming obstacles faced by many during reentry have contributed to heightened interest in identifying effective strategies for managing the reentry process. It is well documented that returning prisoners have limited occupational or educational experiences to prepare them for employment, drug and alcohol addictions, mental and physical health problems, strained family relations, and limited opportunities due to the stigma of a criminal record (Petersilia 2003; Travis and Visher 2005; Lattimore and Visher 2009). Thus, it is not surprising that as many as two-thirds of released prisoners are rearrested within 3 years, and over 50 % return to prison or jail (Langan and Levin 2002).

Parole violations play a large role in reincarceration rates. The majority of released prisoners – an estimated 74 % of those released from state prisons in 2009 – are released conditionally, including release to parole, probation, supervised mandatory release, or other conditional release (West et al. 2010). However, many parolees do not complete their term successfully, although the trend toward increasingly high failure rates for parolees appears to have reversed in recent years. In 2000, only 43 % of parolees completed their term successfully or were discharged early (Glaze 2007). This percentage increased to 51 % in 2009, following a trend toward increasing success rates that began in 2006 (Glaze and Bonczar 2010). Among those returned to incarceration, the majority are reincarcerated for technical violations, with only 26 % reincarcerated for a new conviction (Glaze and Bonczar 2010). Additionally, the likelihood of successful completion is lower for parolees who have violated a previous parole term when compared with those who have not. Among state parolees discharged in 1999, only 21 % of parolees with a previous violation successfully completed parole, compared to 63.5 % of first releases (Hughes et al. 2001). Despite a shift toward more positive parole outcomes in recent years, consistently high failure rates among parolees suggest the need for alternative strategies for managing reentry.

In response to the high post-release failure rates and the overwhelming needs of returning prisoners, many reentry programs have been implemented over the past several years to facilitate returning ex-offenders’ transition from prison and, ultimately, to reduce recidivism. Several high-profile efforts to promote successful prisoner reintegration by involving a variety of community stakeholders in the design and delivery of rehabilitative services have been implemented, including the Reentry Partnerships Initiative, the Serious and Violent Offender Reentry Initiative (SVORI), the Reintegration of Ex-Offenders program (RExO; formerly the Prisoner Reentry Initiative), and most recently the Second Chance Act.

Reentry courts are distinguished from other approaches to prisoner reentry because they combine rehabilitative services with the power of the courts. Reentry courts began as part of the broader national movement towards specialized “problem-solving courts” to address issues such as drug addiction, mental health problems, driving under the influence, and domestic violence. These problem-solving courts address a wide array of problems but share several elements, including treatment mandates, ongoing judicial supervision, collaboration rather than the traditional adversarial system, direct interaction between defendants and the judge, and community outreach.

Based on the success of the drug court movement, it was thought that a similar model could be applied to support prisoner reintegration. The concept of leveraging judicial authority to manage reentry for returning prisoners through reentry courts was first introduced by Jeremy Travis. Reentry courts recognize that the point of reentry is a critical juncture for intervention and that the judiciary should play a greater role in managing reentry (Travis 2000). Traditional criminal justice policy was thought to constrain the authority and reach of parole agencies and correctional institutions, requiring a new organizational strategy for effectively managing reentry (Travis 2000). Further, court-based reentry management was thought to provide an opportunity for the reentry process to begin at sentencing and continue through the release period (Travis 2000).

Since the conceptualization of this model for managing prisoner reentry, multiple jurisdictions have developed reentry courts. The following section describes the early implementation experiences, including federal efforts to support the application of the reentry court model, and program design characteristics of reentry courts.

Background Description

Federal Efforts To Promote Reentry Courts

Early demonstrations of the reentry court model were promoted by the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) through its national Reentry Court Initiative (RCI). In 2000, OJP identified nine pilot projects (including both adult and juvenile programs) to receive technical assistance for the creation of reentry courts that would provide graduated sanctions in combination with social services (OJP 1999). The goal of the RCI was to “establish a seamless system of offender accountability and support services throughout the reentry process” (OJP 1999). Several core elements were identified among the RCI pilot programs (Lindquist et al. 2004). These components include (1) assessment and planning, in which an interagency process was used to identify appropriate candidates and ensure needs assessment and planning prior to release; (2) active oversight through public judicial status hearings required regularly throughout participation and involving the reentry court team; (3) social services, including the identification and marshalling of necessary resources and a case management approach to ensure their appropriate provision; (4) community accountability through an advisory board and the use of restitution and victim involvement; (5) graduated sanctions in lieu of revocations, with the swift, predictable, and universal administration of a predetermined range of sanctions; and (6) incentives for success to recognize program milestones, ideally administered in a public forum.

Federal interest in reentry courts remained strong, and a decade after the RCI, the Bureau of Justice Assistance solicited applications to fund adult reentry courts under the Second Chance Act of 2007 (Pub. L. 110–199). Several reentry courts were funded under the Bureau of Justice Assistance’s FY2010 State, Tribal, and Local Reentry Courts Program and the Bureau of Justice Assistance’s FY2009 solicitation for Second Chance Act Adult Demonstration Projects. The framework for establishing a reentry court under the Second Chance Act was based on the RCI and lessons learned from other early reentry courts, with grantees required to include the six RCI components described above. An emphasis on the use of validated assessment tools, tracking of services received by participants, and the use of evidence-based practices distinguished the Bureau of Justice Assistance requirements for reentry courts from those of the RCI (Bureau of Justice Assistance 2010).

Current Estimates Of Reentry Courts

The number of reentry courts currently in operation is difficult to estimate. Reentry courts have been established in the federal, state, county, and tribal systems, with some entailing a partnership between government entities. As with drug courts, some programs are subject to statewide oversight for reentry courts, including certification, compliance monitoring, training and technical assistance, and evaluation (Wolf 2011). The National Drug Court Institute reported that 26 reentry courts and 29 reentry drug courts – a common model for reentry courts, as described in more detail below – were in operation as of December 31, 2009 (Huddleston and Marlowe 2011). Including federal reentry courts and programs newly implemented as part of the Bureau of Justice Assistance Second Chance Act reentry grants would increase the estimate. However, although there has been interest in the reentry court concept since its introduction, reentry courts have not witnessed the exponential growth that has been observed for drug courts and other types of problem-solving courts. Instead, implementation of the reentry court concept has been tentative. As described below, implementation challenges – particularly jurisdictional authority and the diverse and overwhelming needs of the target population – are likely responsible for the hesitancy in embracing this model.

Program Design Characteristics

Jurisdictional Authority. The mechanism for judicial authority is a major distinguishing factor among reentry courts and represents an area of complexity for jurisdictions interested in implementing this model. Some reentry courts are administrative courts, in which programmatic authority is maintained by the executive branch. In contrast, others are criminal courts, in which the judicial branch has authority.

Administrative reentry courts are typically part of the corrections system. Under this model, participation is established as a condition of release from prison and an administrative reentry court judge presides over the court hearings. Some states use retired judges or other judicial officers to lead these status hearings (see Tauber 2008).

Reentry court programs run by the judicial branch commonly use split-sentencing jurisdiction, in which an offender is sentenced to prison for a determinate sentence and returned to the jurisdiction of the court for a probationary period after serving the prison sentence, under the active supervision of the reentry court judge. In other jurisdictions, the courts have the statutory authority to sentence offenders to prison with the possibility of early discharge for resentencing after a short term or to sentence offenders to prison to complete a rehabilitation program and then be returned to the sentencing judge after successful completion (see Tauber 2008). With reentry courts operated by the judiciary, the sentencing judge retains jurisdiction over a case during the entire sentence.

Finally, some states are experimenting with collaborative reentry court structures, in which both the courts and correctional authorities are involved in the administration of the program. Such models entail either dual jurisdiction, with the court operated by the county and parole jurisdiction held by the correctional authority, or sole jurisdiction by the correctional authority but with active participation of the reentry court (see Tauber 2008). Regardless of the source of jurisdictional authority, reentry courts are typically mandatory in nature, with eligible participants required to participate.

Target Populations. Risk variability among reentry court participants is a main deviation from the drug court model. Although some reentry courts target a particular population, including narrowly defined offense types or clients with specific treatment needs, such as mental health or addiction issues (Lindquist et al. 2004), most reentry courts do not appear to specialize with regard to client type, resulting in the need to address a variety of client risks and needs. In addition to substance abuse treatment, reentry courts commonly deliver mental health counseling, assistance with housing, transportation, education, vocational training, employment, and other support services oriented toward returning prisoners (Lindquist et al. 2004). This holistic service delivery approach implies a larger network of service providers for reentry courts than for drug courts.

In addition, whereas drug court clients are typically nonviolent, there is a growing trend among reentry courts to focus on individuals assessed at high risk (Wolf 2011). Some reentry courts enroll several “tracks” of participants, including not only newly reentering prisoners but also parole violators assigned to reentry court rather than having their supervision revoked, as well as probationers sentenced to community supervision and reentry court rather than incarceration. However, it is questionable whether serving individuals who are not returning from incarceration is consistent with the original reentry court model; some programs that primarily serve individuals diverted from incarceration are called “pre-entry courts” and seek to keep individuals out of prison (Wolf 2011).

Reentry courts have been designed for both juveniles and adults. In 2005, the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges published a guide for planning, implementing, and operating a juvenile court to manage the reintegration into the community of juveniles who have undergone court-ordered, out-of-home placement.

Reentry Drug Courts. Reflecting the widespread need for substance abuse treatment among returning prisoners, a common model for reentry courts entails the combination of reentry courts with drug courts (i.e., “reentry drug courts”). As noted earlier, slightly more reentry drug courts were in operation in 2009 (n=29) than reentry courts not combined with drug courts (n=26) (Huddleston and Marlowe 2011). Although several models for reentry drug courts have been proposed, the most common model currently in operation appears to entail jailor prison-based substance using offenders being released from incarceration directly to a drug court. (See Tauber 2009, for a discussion of potential models for diverting prison-bound nonviolent drug-involved offenders to local jails for jail-based reentry drug courts and violent drug-involved offenders to prison-based reentry drug courts.) Importantly, reentry drug courts use the drug court model in facilitating the reintegration of drug-involved offenders into the community upon their release (Huddleston and Marlowe 2011).

Reentry drug court participants receive regular judicial monitoring, intensive treatment, community supervision, drug testing, and ancillary services necessary for successful community reintegration (Tauber and Huddleston 1999). The reentry drug court model can ensure continuity of treatment and accountability for returning prisoners from incarceration through reentry. Furthermore, it can allow jurisdictions with a drug court to capitalize on this existing infrastructure.

Point of Programmatic Entry and Exit. Reentry courts were originally conceptualized so that jurisdictional oversight began at sentencing and continued through the period of release (Travis 2000). Indeed, the calls for a collaborative approach were based on the assumption that the tasks of preparing offenders for release and transitioning them back into the community would be coordinated between courts and corrections (see Wilkinson et al. 2004; Burke 2001).

Some reentry courts do entail this level of coordination and consistent involvement beginning at sentencing. For example, in some courts the sentencing judge makes decisions about where a person is incarcerated, exerts influence over the programming he or she will receive while incarcerated, and stays updated about his or her progress (Wolf 2011). However, other reentry courts do not identify or enroll participants until immediately prior to, or even after, release (Lindquist et al. 2004). The post-release phase appears to be increasingly emphasized. For example, NDCI’s current definition of reentry courts emphasizes court involvement “during the initial phases of.. .community integration” (Huddleston and Marlowe 2011). Although early identification and the ongoing involvement of the sentencing judge offer several advantages, this model may not be possible for all programs. Many courts do not have the capacity to “reach in” to prisons or jails for screening, enrollment, or monitoring of prerelease services. However, some reentry courts transfer participants to transitional housing units in the correctional facility prior to release or to secure residential facilities in the community (Wolf 2011).

The point of exit for reentry court participants, particularly the degree of overlap between reentry court participation and parole (or other post-release supervision), has not been well documented. In some programs, reentry court participation extends throughout the period of post-release supervision. In others, reentry court has a defined duration, such as 6–12 months (Lindquist et al. 2004). According to Huddleston and Marlowe (2011), reentry court graduates are often transferred to traditional parole supervision, at which point they may continue to receive case management services through the reentry court on a voluntary basis. However, very little documentation exists about the duration of reentry court participation relative to participants’ parole sentence (or other post-release supervision mechanism) and the mechanism by which graduates exit reentry court.

Reentry Court Practices

Assessment and planning has been strongly emphasized by the Bureau of Justice Assistance in its oversight of the Second Chance Act Reentry Courts. In particular, the need for using validated assessment tools to identify appropriate candidates for reentry courts, with individuals at high risk of recidivism increasingly recognized as benefitting the most from such programming, has been widely disseminated. The use of needs assessments for planning individualized services (both prior to and after release) and continually reassessing service needs has received less attention. Furthermore, the extent to which best practices in assessment and planning are implemented in the field has not been documented.

Active judicial oversight, which includes public judicial status hearings required regularly throughout participation and involving the reentry court team, has received substantial attention, and several ingredients are thought to be particularly salient (see Hamilton 2010). As with drug courts, reentry courts leverage judicial authority through formal court proceedings (Travis 2005), with the judge’s role expanded beyond traditional criminal court proceeding to include involvement in reentry planning and case management in a collaborative manner. Second, procedural justice is thought to be a critical output resulting from the use of the public forum (through court hearings). Because the reentry court judge is responsible for openly and publicly explaining program requirements and the purpose of sanctions (Travis 2005), it is thought that under the reentry court model (as with other problem-solving courts), participants develop a greater perception of fairness, which, in turn, increases the likelihood of compliance (Tyler 1988). Furthermore, rather than the closed-door process typically used by traditional parole, the reentry court utilizes a public forum that is thought to contribute to a greater perception of fairness. Finally, consistent with the drug court model, ceremonies or other activities intended to recognize accomplishments are used to incentivize and mark interim compliance and successful participation culminates in a public graduation (Travis 2005).

The remaining core elements, such as graduated sanctions, incentives for success, community accountability, and social services, have not been well documented among the reentry courts currently in operation. While reentry courts do appear to use graduated sanctions and incentives for success, the manner in which they are used has not been well documented. Similarly, little is known about reentry courts’ strategies for identifying and marshalling needed social services and incorporating principles of community accountability among such a diverse population.

State Of The Art: The Effectiveness Of Reentry Courts

Because the reentry court model remains a relatively new innovation, much of the existing research involves only case studies, process evaluations, and documentation of implementation challenges that have arisen in particular programs. Few outcome and impact evaluations have been conducted to provide evidence supporting the effectiveness of the reentry court model. The limited research available to date, most of which has substantial methodological limitations, is summarized below.

In an evaluation of Delaware’s Reentry Drug Court, which was implemented in 1993 and is designed to assist offenders who reenter the community following the completion of a residential treatment program, rearrest rates for program graduates were compared to those for the general prison population released between 1981 and 1984. The reentry drug court graduates were less likely to be rearrested for a new felony crime (9 %) than general releases (28 %). Individuals who enrolled in, but did not graduate from, the program were slightly more likely to be arrested (29.1 %) than general releases (Gebelein 2003).

A similar approach was employed in an early evaluation of the Allen County, Indiana Reentry Court. The program was established in 2001 as a complement to the county’s Community Transition Program, which accepts selected inmates to a prerelease probation period prior to their anticipated release date. Participation in the project is voluntary and involves 24-h supervision, judicial monitoring and sanctioning, and relevant service referrals by a reentry court team that includes a judge, case managers, treatment professionals, and parole officers. An outcome evaluation was conducted to compare recidivism rates for program participants to national averages. Overall, 3-year rearrest rates for graduates and nongraduates of the program were lower than the national average of 67.5 % (Pearson-Nelson 2009).

The federal reentry court in Oregon (the District of Oregon), which began in 2006 as a strategy to reduce recidivism among druginvolved offenders following their release from a completed term of incarceration, entails judicial supervision through monthly hearings and reentry services that address risk factors including substance abuse, employment, and housing. Participation is voluntary and graduates receive a 1-year reduction of their probation sentence following successful completion (Aubin 2009). An evaluation of the program found that reentry court participants had higher levels of supervision and service receipt than a comparison group, but lower levels of employment and more sanctions (Close et al. 2008).

These three outcome evaluations have significant limitations that make it difficult to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of the reentry court program being evaluated. The most empirically rigorous reentry court evaluation published to date focused on the Harlem Parole Reentry Court and was conducted by the Center for Court Innovation (Hamilton 2010). The Harlem Parole Reentry Court, in operation since 2001, is a collaboration between the Center for Court Innovation and the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services and Division of Parole. The program provides judicial oversight, supervision, and services to parolees returning to Upper Manhattan in New York City for 6 months following their release from incarceration (Hamilton 2010).

The evaluation used propensity score matching to select a comparison group of parolees released to traditional supervision during the study period. Recidivism outcomes were tracked for all parolees in the sample for 3 years following their release from incarceration (Hamilton 2010). Over the 3-year follow-up period, the reentry court program was found to have a positive impact on preventing new criminal behavior, including rearrest and reconviction for new crimes. Reentry court parolees were less likely to be rearrested and were significantly less likely to be rearrested for a misdemeanor in the first year and drug offenses in the first 2 years. Reentry court parolees were also significantly less likely to be reconvicted than comparison parolees over all 3 years at risk in the community. At 3 years, reentry court participants were 10 % less likely to have been reconvicted than comparison parolees. However, reentry court parolees were found to be significantly more likely to experience revocation after 2–3 years than comparison parolees. Three years following release, reentry court parolees were 18 % more likely to have experienced a revocation, particularly revocations due to technical violations.

These results indicate that the reentry court may have a negative impact on its parolees that may be due to “supervision effects,” in which lower caseloads and more intensive supervision lead to increased opportunities for the detection of (and response to) noncompliant behavior. The report suggests the exploration of graduated and alternative sanctions protocols in reentry courts to reduce or avoid supervision effects. Currently, the Center for Court Innovation is implementing a randomized control trial of the Harlem Parole Reentry Court following additional programmatic modifications that will produce an empirically rigorous evaluation of the impact of the reentry court on recidivism and other outcomes important to reintegration, including employment and substance abuse.

In addition to the ongoing experimental evaluation of the Harlem Parole Reentry Court, a multi-site evaluation of the 2010 Second Chance Act Reentry Court grantees is also underway. The evaluation is funded by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) and led by Northwest Professional Consortium (NPC), in collaboration with Research Triangle Institute (RTI) International and the Center for Court Innovation. The study, known as NIJ’s Evaluation of Second Chance Act Adult Reentry Courts (NESCAARC), includes a process evaluation, impact evaluation, and cost-benefit analysis. In addition, the evaluation will contribute to the development of a true reentry court model by determining the extent to which the sites reveal a common framework. Results are expected to be available beginning in 2015.

Issues And Research Gaps

Awareness of the need to effectively manage prisoner reentry has been heightened in the past several decades. As a result, reentry courts are an innovative strategy for managing the complex problems associated with prisoner reentry. Yet this model remains a fledgling approach, with both implementation strategies and evaluation lagging behind other problem-solving courts.

Part of the hesitancy to embrace the reentry court model may be due to implementation challenges, which can be substantial. Issues such as establishing jurisdictional authority over the target population, developing strategies for the identification and monitoring of participants prior to release, and serving the wide ranging needs of such a diverse population may appear (or be) insurmountable for some jurisdictions. Better documentation is needed from programs that have successfully implemented a reentry court model, including documentation of the challenges that were encountered and the solutions employed to overcome these challenges. Several models of jurisdictional authority have been proposed by Judge Jeffrey Tauber, editor of Reentry Court Solutions. Yet more documentation about the application of these models or barriers associated with each is needed.

Additionally, strategies for courts (particularly programs operated by the judicial branch) to “reach in” to prisons or jails to access participants prior to release have not received as much attention. Many courts do not have the capability to engage in prerelease planning and coordination, leading to a tendency for most reentry courts to focus exclusively on post-release programming. However, an uninterrupted continuum of services, particularly substance abuse, mental health, and healthcare services, is recognized as one of the keys to reentry success following release.

A necessary component of the reentry court model is the early identification of participants’ needs and the provision of a seamless transition of services from facility to community. An understanding of the necessary steps to establish a continuum of services within reentry court models is necessary to provide maximum substantial benefits for program participants.

Additional attention to develop strategies for adequately meeting the needs of the target population is needed, along with strategies for generating public support for the focus on returning prisoners. It has been observed that the application of the drug court model to returning prisoners may be less successful and have less popular and political support because while drug courts concentrate on the problem of addiction and serve a relatively homogenous group of clients (nonviolent drug addicts), reentering prisoners have numerous, diverse needs and are often at high risk of violence (Maruna and LeBel 2003). Not only are reentry court participants at higher risk, they may have served substantial terms of incarceration. As a result, they may need more services than drug court participants. In addition, it has been argued that more flexibility in response to technical violations and minor offenses is required for returning prisoners, rather than a “heavy handed” approach. Encouragement, incentives, and a sense of community are thought to be particularly important.

Research on operational barriers, such as interagency cooperation, is also needed. Although not documented in the research literature, it is possible that lack of interagency cooperation may be more common with reentry courts than other problem-solving courts because partners may have different visions for the program or agreement on the target population. For example, decisions about whether to include violent or sex offenders have implications for the level of support from prosecutors, acceptance from service providers, intensity of supervision expected from probation or parole officers, and support from the public for the program. Additionally, changing attitudes and agency culture can also be difficult to bring collaborative agency staff in line with the reentry court’s mission and goals. Farole (2003) reported that staff cooperation, communication, and turf issues with parole officers were a significant implementation challenge for the Harlem Parole Reentry Court in its initial stages. Without the buy-in and cooperation of all court stakeholders, including outside agency staff, the reentry court model will not achieve the desired levels of program fidelity and therefore, may fail to successfully achieve its goals.

Finally, as noted above, rigorous studies of the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of reentry courts are needed. Multi-site evaluations and research on approaches to minimize supervision effects are particularly needed, along with the exploration of a broader set of outcomes (in addition to reincarceration) and longer-term follow-up. Importantly, such studies must employ a rigorous strategy for identifying a comparison group that is well matched to the reentry court participants on all eligibility criteria when an experimental design and random assignment are not possible. In addition, evaluations should employ an “intent to treat” approach such that all individuals assigned to the reentry court (not just successful completers) are included in the treatment group. This approach is the most rigorous test of program effectiveness because it does not rely solely on the experiences of clear program “successes.”

Very little is known about the cost-effectiveness of reentry courts, and research in this area would be of substantial interest. The issue of which risk levels are targeted by reentry courts may have implications for the cost-benefit ratio of the reentry court. The growing trend is to target offenders assessed as being high risk, typically with regard to risk of violence or serious crime. However, participants in the Bureau of Justice Assistance focus group noted that greater cost savings to the criminal justice system would likely be achieved if risk were defined as risk for reoffending, which is generally higher among low-level drug offenders and the mentally ill (Wolf 2011).

Bibliography:

Aubin M (2009) The district of oregon reentry court: an evidence-based model. Fed Sentencing Rep 22(1):39–43
Burke PB (2001) Collaboration for successful prisoner reentry: the role of parole and the courts. Correct Manag Q 5(3):11–22
Bureau of Justice Assistance (1997) Defining drug courts: the key components. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Washington, DC, NCJ 205621
Bureau of Justice Assistance (2010) Second chance act state, local, and tribal reentry courts FY2010 competitive grant announcement. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Washington, DC, OMB No. 1121-0329. http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/grant/10SecondChanceCourtsSol.pdf
Close DW, Alltucker K, Aubin M et al (2008) The District of Oregon Reentry Court: Evaluation, Policy Recommendations, and Replication Strategies. United States District Court – District of Oregon. http://www.ussc. gov/Education_and_Training/Annual_National_Training_Seminar/2009/008c_Reentry_Court_Doc.pdf
Farole D (2003) The harlem parole reentry court evaluation: implementation and preliminary impacts. Center for Court Innovation, New York, http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/har lemreentryeval.pdf
Gebelein RS (2003) Delaware’s reentry drug court: a practical approach to substance abusing offenders. Paper prepared for the conference on European Perspectives on Drug Courts. http://courts.delaware.gov/ Superior/pdf/Reentry_France_27Mar03.pdf
Glaze L (2007) Probation and parole in the United States, 2006. U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Washington, DC, NCJ 220218
Glaze L, Bonczar TP (2010) Probation and parole in the United States, 2009. U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Washington, DC, NCJ 231674
Hamilton Z (2010) Do reentry courts reduce recidivism? Results from the Harlem parole reentry court. Center for court innovation. http://www.courtinnovation.org/ sites/default/files/Reentry_Evaluation.pdf
Huddleston C, Marlowe D (2011) Painting the current picture: a national report card on drug courts and other problem-solving court programs in the United States. National Drug Court Institute, Alexandria, http://www.ndci.org/sites/default/files/nadcp/PCP%20Report%20FINAL.PDF
Hughes TA, Wilson DJ, Beck AJ (2001) Trends in State parole, 1990-2000. U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Washington, DC, NCJ 184735
Langan P, Levin D (2002) Recidivism of prisoners released in 1994. US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Washington, DC, NCJ 193427
Lattimore PK, Visher C (2009) The multi-site evaluation of SVORI: summary and synthesis. Research Triangle Institute, Research Triangle Park
Lindquist C, Hardison J, Lattimore P (2004) The reentry court initiative: court-based strategies for managing released prisoners. Justice Res Policy 6(1):97–118
Maruna S, LeBel T (2003) Welcome home? Examining the “reentry court” concept from a strengths-based perspective. West Criminol Rev 4(2):91–107
Office of Justice Programs (1999) Reentry courts: managing the transition from prison to community, a call for concept papers. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Washington DC
Pearson-Nelson D (2009) Allen county community corrections – reentry court program impact evaluation. School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University-Purdue University Fort Wayne, http://www.allencountycorrections.com/pdfs/reports/ ReEntry%20Court%20Impact%20Evaluation%2002%2004%2009.pdf
Petersilia J (2003) When prisoners come home: parole and prisoner reentry. Oxford University Press, New York
Tauber J (2008) State prison based models. http://www. reentrycourtsolutions.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/STATE-PRISON-BASED-MODELS.pdf
Tauber J (2009) A state reentry/drug court proposal: a means to achieve correctional reform. http://www. com/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/A-state-reentry-drug-court-proposal.pdf
Tauber J, Huddleston CW (1999) Reentry drug courts: closing the gap. National Drug Court Institute, Alexandria
Travis J (2000) But they all come back: rethinking prisoner reentry. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Washington, DC, Sentencing & Corrections: Issues for the 21st Century, No. 7
Travis J (2005) But they all come back: facing the challenges of prisoner reentry. Urban Institute Press, Washington, DC
Travis J, Petersilia J (2001) Reentry reconsidered: a new look at an old question. Crime Delinq 47:291–313
Travis J, Visher C (eds) (2005) Prisoner reentry and crime in America. Cambridge University Press, New York
Tyler T (1988) The social psychology of procedural justice. Plenum, New York
West HC, Sabol WIJ, Greenman SJ (2010) Prisoners in 2009. U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Washington, DC, NCJ 231675
Wilkinson RA, Bucholtz GA, Siegfried GM et al. (2004) “Prison reform through offender reentry: a partnership between courts and corrections”. Pace Law Review. Paper 10. http://digitalcommons.pace. edu/lawrev/10
Wolf RV (2011) Reentry courts: looking ahead: a conversation about strategies for offender reintegration. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Washington, DC, U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance