Theories of Co-Offending Research Paper

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This research paper is focused on theories and theorizing about co-offending. This includes explaining why people co-offend in the first place, how co-offenders find each other and initiate their crimes, and how co-offending may have consequences for offenders and offending rates. The paper starts by outlining three general approaches in the field. After that, a small number of “Theories of co-offending” are addressed in more detail—elaborated theoretical publications about understanding the causes of co-offending or certain aspects of it. Finally, a number of other theoretical issues are addressed, which have received quite some attention in the field. Following each of these issues, a short outline is provided for the remaining questions that are still in need of further theoretical elaboration.

Introduction

One of the basic findings of criminology is that a substantial part of crime is committed in the company of others—“co-offending.” Early twentieth-century scholars already signaled that co-offending is abundant, particularly among juveniles. Since then, a body of empirical research has emerged in which considerable knowledge has been gathered about the regularities of co-offending and the characteristics of co-offenders (see the other entries in this area).

Co-offending is not only an interesting subject for empirical study, it also poses many interesting and profound theoretical questions. Since breaking the law does not necessarily require others, the sheer phenomenon of co-offending itself is meaningful and in need of explanation. Not everyone is willing and capable to break the law, and it is important to understand how multiple offenders find and choose each other and communicate to make co-offending possible. And since co-offenders interact with each other, offending in company may have important consequences for the modus operandi of the offense and the criminal careers of those who are involved. Co-offending implies that the “antisocial” activity of offending must have many social aspects. It may teach us many things about the relationships and social structures that govern the collective behavior of offenders (Weerman 2003).

Although theorizing about co-offending has received much less attention as empirical study of the subject and much less attention as theorizing about crime and delinquency in general, a few contributions in the field explicitly aimed to theorize the causes and consequences of co-offending (Felson 2003; McCarthy et al. 1998; Tremblay 1993; Weerman 2003). More theorizing about co-offending, explicit or implicit (scattered notions and hypotheses), can be found in several empirically oriented studies (e.g., Carrington 2009; McGloin et al. 2008, McGloin and Stickle 2011; Morselli et al. 2006; Reiss and Farrington 1991; Van Mastrigt and Farrington 2011; Warr 1996). It is possible to distinguish a few general approaches or perspectives and a couple of more formally elaborated “theories of co-offending.” However, there are also remaining theoretical questions about co-offending that are in need of further elaboration.

Three General Perspectives

Sometimes explicit, but more often implicit, basic assumptions are made about the nature of co-offending, and scholars build their arguments upon them. Some regard co-offending as living proof of the “group character” of crime and the importance of peers; some scholars think of co-offending as a merely coincidental convergence of offenders at the same place and time; and others view co-offending as an instrument to optimize the execution of an offense. These three diverging views coincide with important general perspectives in criminology (social learning theories, control theories, and the routine activities or rational choice approach), and as such they may be regarded as competing perspectives. They may also be seen as points of view that highlight different aspects of co-offending.

Co-Offending As The Result Of Peer Or Group Influence

Many scholars writing about co-offending see it as the necessary result of peer influence or group dynamics. For example, Shaw and McKay (1931) regarded delinquency as mainly group behavior and co-offending as one of the ways in which offending was transmitted among young people. Delinquents learned their techniques from older, more experienced offenders. Scholars who revived interest in co-offending in the 1970s also regarded it as the result of group dynamics. Some of them argued that the abundance of co-offending is an indication that “delinquency is still group behavior” (Erickson and Jensen 1977). More recently, Warr (2002) argued that co-offending, together with the association between delinquency and delinquent peers, provides evidence of the social nature of criminal behavior.

If one would reconstruct the basic arguments of this perspective, the causal path would run from being part of a group and/or having delinquent peers to being exposed to peer influences that lead someone to join others in offending. Peer influence may consist of social learning mechanisms and the acquisition of delinquent definitions and group processes like fear of ridicule and the urge to show loyalty and obtain status during adolescence (see Warr 2002). People co-offend because the group in which they became delinquent also leads them to join in criminal activities within the group.

Co-Offending As The Result Of Social Selection

Some scholars explicitly denied that peer influence is a major cause of delinquent behavior (e.g., Hirschi 1969). According to them, other causes, mainly within the individual and the family (e.g., a weak bond of society or lack of self-control), are responsible for the onset of delinquency. Having delinquent peers is a byproduct: criminal or delinquent groups are formed because offenders find each other in the same circumstances or select each other as friends (“birds of a feather stick together”). Their argument also accounts for co-offending: this is the result of offenders who are in each other’s company because of social selection. Most explicit about this is Kornhauser (1978), who argued that co-offending is nothing special, since adolescents do most of their activities in groups. More recently, Stolzenberg and D’Alessio (2008) posited that co-offending among juveniles is “theoretically inconsequential.” They argue that youths tend to be more gregarious than adults (having a tendency to spend time with others), and therefore also tend to commit their crimes more often in groups as adults and more often than alone.

The basic arguments of this perspective would be that co-offending occurs as byproduct when offenders associate together and spend a lot of time in groups. For reasons other than peer influence, offenders are prepared to join criminal activities, and they will co-offend when they are coincidentally together and an offense opportunity emerges.

Co-Offending As An Instrumental Or Rational Choice

Finally, several scholars analyze co-offending from an instrumental or rational angle. According to the rational choice perspective in criminology, decisions of offenders may be regarded as if they were rational calculations of the expected rewards and costs of certain actions. The decision to co-offend is also analyzed as a rational or instrumental decision. Researchers who have studied specific crimes like burglary and robbery often adhere to this approach, when they describe co-offending as a way of making the offense easier and more rewarding (e.g., Walsh 1986). Also a number of scholars who explicitly theorized about co-offending have reasoned from an instrumental view on co-offending. For example, Tremblay (1993) assumes that co-offending is required for many types of offending, including organized crime, and many motivated offenders need to find suitable co-offenders. According to him, this quest can be regarded as the outcome of individual decision making depending on situational circumstances (see the next section). Likewise, McCarthy et al. (1998) analyzed co-offending as a form of cooperation between in essence selfish parties to optimize the perpetration of the offense. However, they went a step further by looking at collective forms of rationality and ways in which co-offenders deal with the risks of being betrayed.

The basic arguments of this perspective would be that the decision to co-offend is more or less rational, and that it involves weighing advantages of co-offending against the potential costs. Co-offending can ease the execution of the offense and increase the expected catch, but it also implies that profits have to be shared and that co-offenders may cheat or talk to the police. Co-offending is chosen when it is expected to be easier and more rewarding than solo-offending.

Explicit Theoretical Contributions To The Literature About Co-Offending

A few publications can be regarded as more or less explicit theories of co-offending, focused on explaining the phenomenon itself, particular aspects of it, and/or variation in co-offending among offenders and situations. These publications will be addressed in more detail below.

Understanding How Co-Offenders Find Each Other (Tremblay, Felson)

One of the first scholars who explicitly theorized about co-offending was Tremblay (1993). In a paper titled (Searching for Suitable Co-offenders), he theorized about the criteria for suitable co-offenders and how they may be found. This paper employed a broader conception of co-offending than usually followed in the literature: encompassing not only the actual companions during the crime but also accomplices and acquaintances that are needed before and after the offense—advisers, fences, and sellers and buyers of illegal goods.

According to Tremblay, many acts of crime become possible only when an offender can find suitable co-offenders. This is more complex as it may appear: an offender needs to get in contact with someone that can be trusted and is able to provide the needed services, which can be very specialized. The availability of co-offenders may be increased by certain social circumstances: neighborhoods with relatively more offenders, periods of high unemployment, and time spent in a prison. However, even if there are high concentrations of potential co-offenders, choices need to be made on who is actually a partner in a particular offense or a series of crimes.

Tremblay assumes that there are two main criteria to decide which co-offenders are suitable and how many: trustworthiness and usefulness. Trustworthiness is most benefited by a small number of co-offenders with who one has a strong relation or bond (e.g., family or friends). However, because this is often not possible, offenders often adopt a basic attitude of distrust towards potential co-offenders. The criterion of usefulness is most benefited by a large social network of friends and vague acquaintances. These relatively weak bonds may enhance contacts with others who have skills and knowledge that the offender needs.

The two basic criteria imply that offenders would be best served by two kinds of social networks at the same time: a cohesive network of strong ties to enhance trust and a large and relatively loose network of weak ties. In practice, this is usually difficult to achieve and Tremblay supposes that most offenders choose one of three strategies to deal with the problem of finding suitable co-offenders. In the “exclusive strategy,” offenders choose one type of network and concentrate on establishing strong bonds with trustworthy others or getting a large social network with many potentially useful co-offenders. In the “mixed strategy,” offenders try to develop a few strong relationships as well as many weak ties. Finally, in the “avoidance strategy,” offenders keep out of the problems by committing only solo-offenses.

More recently, Felson continued theorizing about the problem of finding suitable co-offenders in a paper titled “The process of co-offending” (Felson 2003). Felson concentrates on actual types of co-offending in which at least two offenders are directly and simultaneously cooperating. Drawing on the routine activities approach, combined with a social learning perspective on co-offending, Felson develops a theory that emphasizes the importance of meeting places for offenders, or as he names it “convergence settings.” According to him, these places strongly facilitate co-offenders to find each other and strongly enhance offending rates.

A basic assumption in Felson’s theory is that “access to accomplices is inherently criminogenic” (Felson 2003, p. 151). Several arguments are provided for this stance. First of all, when potential offenders get together there is an increased chance that they will persuade each other to break the law in the near future. Here, Felson clearly adheres to a peer influence perspective on co-offending. Second, offenders may learn a lot of practical things from each other. They may provide each other with information about potential targets and their locations, about the best way to approach them, and dispose of stolen goods. And third, access to accomplices is needed when an offender wants actual assistance and help in carrying out an offense. By getting into contact with other potential offenders, one may find some necessary extra manpower or someone with specialized skills or knowledge.

Having stressed the importance of getting access to co-offenders, Felson argues that finding them is less easy as it may appear. Drawing on routine activities theories, Felson formulates three requirements. First of all, co-offenders need to get together at the same place and time. Second, they must be able to interact with each other without outside interference. And third, they need to have substantial time available to socialize with each other. With regard to the latter, Felson emphasizes that screening the availability and suitability of potential co-offenders is a slow and informal process: offenders need to size each other up and bond together by talking, drinking, or other informal activities. These three requirements imply that “convergence settings” need to be stable and predictable sources of potential co-offenders. In practice, a small number of places apply: places like street segments, bars, houses, and neighborhood facilities, often only during particular hours. This relative rarity implies that they are important determinants of crime in a certain area, making them potentially interesting targets for intervention.

Understanding How The Risks Of Co-Offending Are Dealt With (Mccarthy Et Al.)

Co-offending involves risks and costs. In a paper titled “Uncertainty, cooperation, and crime: understanding the decision to co-offend,” McCarthy et al. (1998) ask themselves how it is possible that offenders cooperate, despite their conflicting interests and basic uncertainty about the real intentions of the other. Offenders, they argue, can never be sure whether co-offenders stick to their agreements and refrain from cheating or talking to the police. Co-offending has resemblance to a “prisoner’s dilemma,” in which the least preferred option for co-offenders would be the situation in which they would cooperate and the other would cheat. To explain how co-offending is possible in this situation, McCarthy et al. draw on sociological literature about social dilemmas, situations in which individual and collective goals are contradicting. This literature suggests that people are capable of reasoning with “collective rationality.” Individuals can take other people’s wishes and needs into account when the end result is also in their own interest. In the case of co-offending, collective rationality dictates that it is in each other’s interest not to talk to the police and share the profits of the crime, to ensure future collaboration. Adding to this, trust is needed to be confident that co-offenders also take collective rationality into account in their decision making.

A complicating factor is that not all offenders have the luxury to contemplate who is trustworthy and who is not. McCarthy supposes that offenders who are low in status and live in adverse circumstances (e.g., the street youths that were studied by the authors) will be more inclined to join others than others who are less dependent upon others.

Understanding Who Is Co-Offending And Why: Co-Offending As Social Exchange (Weerman)

An attempt to integrate many of the then-existing perspectives on co-offending was undertaken by Weerman (2003) in an article titled “Co-offending as social exchange: explaining characteristics of co-offending.” This paper aimed to formulate a comprehensive theory about why people co-offend and about variations and regularities in co-offending. The theory is based on the social exchange perspective from sociology and psychology. The basic idea of the theory is that co-offending can be analyzed as an event where goods are exchanged between offenders. The “exchange goods” in co-offending are not only material or instrumental, like a share in the gains of the offense (the catch or a payment), but also immaterial, such as social approval and acceptance. According to Weerman, people co-offend because it is a way of obtaining rewards through the exchange of goods that cannot be obtained by solo-offending. Because the exchange is not limited to the material “catch” of the offense, co-offending can occur even when it is not necessary to carry out a specific crime or it can be done in ways that are not the most efficient to complete the offense.

Six types of “co-offending exchange goods” are distinguished in the theory: services, payment, “catch,” appreciation, acceptance, and information. The category of “services” can be considered as basic: these are the co-offenders’ activities that make the offense possible (actual help during the offense, providing devices or resources, being a lookout or just being present during the offense). The category of “catch” consists of the share in the money or goods from the offense, often divided among the co-offenders. The category of “payment” consists of all the material rewards (money or goods) that a co-offender gets from another as payment for his service. The category of “appreciation” is immaterial: the social rewards for the actions of the co-offender (approval or praise). The category of “acceptance” is also immaterial: the social rewards for the person of the co-offender (ranging from toleration in a group to affection, status, and respect). The category of “information” is also immaterial: this refers to knowledge obtained through co-offending (practical knowledge about techniques or contacts or knowledge about the capacities and trustworthiness of co-offenders).

Based on these “exchange goods,” the theory distinguishes different forms of co-offending. In instrumental forms of co-offending, services are exchanged with a share in the catch or with payments. In strategic forms of co-offending, the goal is to obtain important information apart from the catch (e.g., to test someone or to learn a special technique). Material and immaterial rewards are both involved in quasi-instrumental forms of co-offending, when co-offenders try to impress each other with their skills or with their bravado, or when participating in co-offending is required to be a member of a group. In expressive forms of co-offending, only social rewards are involved (e.g., youth groups committing acts of vandalism). Further, co-offending may be equal or unequal, depending on the exchange goods that everyone is receiving.

The theory explains variation among offenders and offenses by referring to three conditions that make co-offending possible. The first condition is that the offender is willing to co-offend. This depends on whether someone perceives co-offending as “profitable enough” and offering material and immaterial exchange goods that exceed the potential costs (sharing the gains, investing time and energy, the possibility of being caught). The theory also assumes that offenders who have mainly immaterial needs, for example, young adolescents who offend to be accepted and appreciated, are in many cases rewarded by co-offending. Offenders with mainly material needs, like professional or addicted criminals, are only rewarded when they get a lot of catch or payment out of co-offending or when co-offending is the only way in which they can obtain the goods they want.

The second condition is that one or more potential co-offenders are directly available or easy to contact. It is assumed that having a large criminal network and being part of a delinquent group facilitates access to potential co-offenders. Further, regular meeting places and times are expected to ease access to potential co-offenders (cf. Felson 2003). The third condition is that offenders need to convince others that they are worthy and useful to co-offend with. This is only the case when the offender has resources that make offending with him “profitable enough” for others. This attractiveness is mainly influenced by the criminal capacities and possibilities of the offender to offer valuable material and immaterial rewards. Someone can be attractive by his or her physical capital (tools like guns and crowbars), human capital (knowledge, smartness, and criminal insight), and social capital (knowing other useful people).

Other Theoretical Issues And Pending Questions About Co-Offending

This section elaborates some important theoretical issues about co-offending that received considerable attention in the literature, though not in the form of systematic theoretical papers. Current notions and hypotheses about these issues are described, and pending questions and gaps in our knowledge are signaled.

Understanding The Process Leading To Co-Offending: Recruitment, Instigation, And Decision Making

An interesting theoretical issue is how co-offending is initiated and whether particular offenders serve as recruiters or initiators. This issue has been the subject of several empirical studies which are based on various theoretical assumptions. Reiss (1988) and Reiss and Farrington (1991) suspected that within the population of offenders, there is a small number of high-rate offenders who act as recruiters. These recruiters would initiate many offenses with less or non-experienced co-offenders. They theorized that these recruiters may get many others involved in their crimes who would otherwise commit no or much less offenses. Recently, Van Mastrigt and Farrington (2011) further investigated the existence of recruiters. They suggested that the developmental taxonomy theory of Moffitt (1993) offers an additional angle to understand recruitment. This theory would predict that recruiters are usually life-course persistent offenders who differ strongly in their characteristics from joiners, presumably adolescent-limited offenders.

In a seminal paper titled “Organization and instigation in criminal groups,” Warr (1996) proposed that the organization of co-offending is much more dynamic and situational as the term “recruiter” suggested; instead co-offenders may act as “instigator” or “joiner” depending on the situation. Based on his empirical results, he supposed that instigators of co-offending do not have certain stable personality characteristics; instead who initiates a crime largely depends on the situation and the group composition among co-offenders. Those who appear to be the oldest among the present adolescents would have the highest probability of becoming an instigator in that situation, because older offenders generally have the highest status in a group.

Recent contributions to the literature suggest that it is also possible that co-offending emerges in other manners, not because one of the present offenders takes an explicit initiative but because subtle processes occur in which offenders become mutually aware of each other’s willingness to commit a crime in a certain situation. Based on a qualitative study among convicted robbers, Hochstetler (2001) distinguishes three ways in which co-offenders may arrive to their decision to commit an offense together. One way is that co-offenders signal to each other with implicit verbal and nonverbal expressions that they recognize a crime opportunity and are willing to act. This is a decision that is slowly built and sometimes only reached in the last moment before the actual offense. A second way is that co-offenders know from each other that they are willing to offend and only need a gesture or a few words to act. A third way is that co-offenders have developed a common identity around a certain type of offense and do not need any communication at all. They commit these offenses with no need for discussion.

A potential next step in theorizing the initiation of co-offending would be to integrate these different opinions and formulate hypotheses about when co-offenders initiate crimes as sole instigators or recruiters and when they do so in concert with other offenders. It might be helpful to distinguish different roles within groups of (potential) co-offenders, each with their own group status and motives to participate in the offense. A further step would be to theorize how co-offending evolves after different ways of initiating it. Social psychological literature about group processes and decision making in small groups may be helpful in this regard.

Understanding Co-Offending Over The Life Course

Another issue that has received much attention in the co-offending literature is the relation between age and co-offending (as offenders become older, they tend to co-offend less often or with less accomplices on average). Much of the literature on this issue is covered by the entries of Van Mastrigt and Carrington. Within these studies, several explanations have been put forward to explain the relationship. Reiss and Farrington (1991) offer two competing hypotheses, which are in fact based on the group influence perspective and the selection perspective on co-offending. One possibility, they suggest, is that most co-offenders are predominantly breaking the law because of group processes; they usually end their criminal career at the end of adolescence, while those who offend alone continue. The other possibility, Reiss and Farrington suggest, is that some co-offenders change their modus operandi as they grow older, partly because they get more experience, but also partly because the availability of co-offenders decrease after adolescence. This would be the logical result of the age-crime curve, which implies that there are relatively many potential co-offenders during adolescence, but increasingly less when offenders grow older. Adding to this, Carrington (2009) suggests that the relation between age and co-offending partly stems from the general tendency of young people to spend time together and do things in groups. He argues that delinquent behavior is just another type of group activity among many others during adolescence (see also Stolzenberg and D’Alessio 2008).

Empirical studies on the relation between age and co-offending offer contradictory findings. This has led some scholars in the field to theorize that co-offending over the life course depends on the type of offense, or that there are actually different types of co-offending trajectories over the life course, with some categories of offenders who do not change their level of solo-or co-offending and other categories with offenders who switch from co-offending to solo-offending (Carrington 2009; McGloin et al. 2008). This is interesting since it suggests that co-offending over the life course is a heterogeneous and dynamic phenomenon: it may differ among offenders, offenses, and situations. Carrington (2009) formulates a number of hypotheses about the relation between co-offending and criminal careers, based on the distinction that Reiss (1988) made between low-and high-rate offenders and the distinction that Moffitt (1993) made between life-course persistent and adolescent-limited offenders. Low-rate offenders would usually start their career with co-offending and may shift towards solo-offending when they get more experienced; high-rate offenders develop their delinquency independent from other offenders and mix solo-and co-offending from the start.

The logical next step in theorizing about the link between age and co-offending would be to understand further why there are different trajectories of co-offending over time, how these trajectories are connected to different motives for co-offending, and, more generally, how co-offending careers are linked to the etiology of delinquency in general.

Understanding The Consequences: When And Why Does Co-Offending Lead To (More) Delinquent Behavior

Many contributions about co-offending stress the fact that it represents a large share of the total amount of crime, in particular if one considers the fact that one act of co-offending involves multiple people (see, e.g., Andresen and Felson 2010). Several studies also suggest that co-offending may have consequences for future offending, in the sense that it may lead to increased levels of (violent) delinquency. An important theoretical issue, then, is to get insight in the consequences of co-offending: does it lead to more crime in the future, and if so why and when?

To start with, opinions diverge whether co-offending is related to increasing levels of crime. According to those who adhere to a selection perspective on co-offending, the phenomenon mainly represents the group character of many activities during adolescence (Kornhauser 1978; Stolzenberg and D’Alessio 2008). The real causes of delinquency are found somewhere else, and this would imply that co-offending would not substantially increase involvement in crime.

Most scholars, however, believe that co-offending is associated with increased levels of offending. Several theoretical arguments have been offered to substantiate this expectation. First of all, co-offending may actually mark the onset of delinquency for many adolescents. Scholars who assign a substantial role to “recruiters” (Reiss 1988; Reiss and Farrington 1991; Van Mastrigt and Farrington 2011) or “mentors” (Morselli et al. 2006) believe that initiators of co-offending often lead inexperienced or novice offenders into (more) offending. Second, many adolescents start their first offense in situations of “pluralistic ignorance,” when young people believe that rule breaking is expected from the others in a group, while in reality this does not need to be the case (see Warr 2002).

Many have also provided arguments why co-offending may enhance involvement in crime. An important mechanism that is offered is social learning. Conway and McCord (2002) suggested that offenders learn particular types of crime through co-offending. Young offenders who would commit their offenses in the company of violent offenders, for example, would imitate this behavior more often in their own future criminal career. Other group mechanisms may be responsible as well. McGloin and Piquero (2009) suggest that offending with relatively many accomplishes facilitate collective behavior and the diffusion of responsibility, which increases the chances of violent behavior in the future.

Another argument why co-offending may lead to increasing and more serious involvement in crime is that it offers access to knowledge, skills, and contacts that make future offending possible. Felson (2003) argues that this is a reason why co-offending not only leads to more future co-offending but also to more future lone offending. Further co-offending increases because accomplices learn how to work together and how to get access to future accomplices. Lone offending is also facilitated when skills and knowledge are obtained through co-offending. Kleemans and Van de Bunt (1999) argued that co-offending often leads to a “social snowball effect.” Offenders who become involved in an ongoing criminal operation use the knowledge and resources that they get from co-offending to set up new and separate illegal businesses that attract other co-offenders.

Future theorizing may focus on the question which categories of offenders are influenced and stimulated most by their involvement in co-offending. It seems logical to connect this question to the issue of recruitment and instigation, because this suggests that some co-offenders may initiate law breaking and convince others to join them. Another fruitful route may be to use life course and developmental criminology. Co-offending may facilitate involvement in crime at particular moments during a criminal career, and life events may counteract these effects or make offenders more susceptible to them.

Understanding Failure And Success In Co-Offending

Another interesting theoretical issue relates to explaining the results of co-offending: when is it rewarding or not and which offense and offender characteristics contribute to the failure or success of co-offending?

In the past, several scholars suggested that co-offending results in higher apprehension risks for those who participate in it, in what has become known as “the group hazard hypothesis” (e.g., Hindelang 1976). They supposed that the presence of two or more offenders increases the chance that one of them makes a mistake, is caught by the police, or when caught, gives in to the pressure to talk about the others. A similar tendency has been suggested in studies focused on offenders of burglary and robbery (e.g., Cromwell et al. 1991). These studies also suggest that burglars and robbers may take more risks when they are in groups. Further, co-offenders may betray each other or cheat by taking an uneven share in the catch (McCarthy et al. 1998).

Whether co-offending exceedingly results in apprehension or not is still an open empirical question. Some studies have suggested that this is the case, but others did not find any difference (see Feyerherm 1980). More importantly, insight is needed on the conditions and circumstances that increase or decrease the risks of co-offending. Several scholars have suggested that social network characteristics of co-offenders and potential co-offenders may facilitate or counteract detection. There is a trade-off between success and risk in criminal networks: having a lot of ties gives you a lot of opportunities, but also adds to the risks of betrayal and apprehension (Morselli 2009). Further, it is suggested that offenders with a central position in the network (having many contacts with others) are the most vulnerable, not only to harmful actions of co-offenders but also to interventions by law enforcement agencies, because they are the “most visible players” (Morselli 2009). Offenders with more strategic but less visible positions are expected to be less vulnerable, because they are often not recognized as the “big man.”

The other side of co-offending (positive from the perspective of the law breaker) is that it may lead to higher gains and more success. Many scholars assume that this is usually the case. Tremblay (1993) supposed that co-offending is required for more sophisticated and organized types of offending, Felson (2003) suggests that co-offending leads to the combination of specialized skills and knowledge that make certain offenses within reach of the individual offenders, and Morselli (2009) argues that co-offending leads to “pooling of resources.” Several authors have theorized that it may be particularly interesting to co-offend with more experienced offenders to get “on-the-job training” and learn the profession. Shaw and McKay (1931) already emphasized the importance of learning from experienced others in the development of criminal careers. Recently, Morselli et al. (2006) argued that having a “mentor” may add directly to criminal success in the sense that it may increase the financial gains that are obtained from offending. Having a mentor may lead to “criminal maturation”: being committed to a criminal lifestyle, carefully planning offenses and taking effort to decrease the risks. Mentors are also pointing others towards their apprentices as being a “criminal talent”, which may offer access to other people and resources.

More generally, many scholars who adhere to a social network perspective assume that access to many potential co-offenders is a key to a successful criminal career. Morselli (2009) argues that the acquirement of new criminal contacts is a leading force behind the criminal careers of major players in organized crime. Success in co-offending may also be acquired by the use of existing social bonds and structures. In this regard, Kleemans and Van de Bunt (1999) emphasized the importance of strong social ties in understanding success in organized crime. Co-offenders who know each other as friends or, even better, as family may have common interests and have access to each other’s resources. Further, they may have built trust in each other, because they have a history together and very probably will meet each other in the future again.

An interesting question is which types of criminal contacts are most beneficial to success in co-offending. Recently, several scholars emphasize that strategic positions in criminal networks offer important advantages in this regard. Offenders who connect relatively distinct parts of the network can act as a “broker” and bring different parties in contact with each other. They have unique access to information and opportunities, and with this position they have the potential to provide important services to others and to take initiatives to co-offend themselves (Morselli 2009). More generally, having relatively few redundant contacts (people that do not know each other) is hypothesized to be associated with criminal success. It implies that someone’s co-offenders provide a high variety in knowledge and skills, which may lead to more offending versatility and opportunities for criminal gains (McGloin and Piquero 2010).

A next step in theorizing success and failure of co-offending would be to combine the literatures about co-offending and social networks with notions about the risks of co-offending and the “group hazard hypothesis.” Further, current thinking about this issue seems to be divided between scholars interested in adolescent group crime and researchers on sophisticated and organized forms of offending. It would be highly interesting to understand when co-offending remains limited to minor and simple forms of illegal behavior, when co-offending enables more serious and sophisticated types of crime, and how simple forms of co-offending may evolve towards serious and successful illegal enterprises.

Final Remarks

After decades of relative silence, interest in co-offending has emerged again since the early 1970s and seems to have increased recently. The last two decades have resulted in several systematic attempts to formulate theories of co-offending or certain aspects of it, and apart from that, an increasing amount of less systematic and explicit theorizing is provided in various empirical studies on co-offending, juvenile delinquency, and organized crime. Nevertheless, in comparison to the large amount of theories on crime and criminal behavior on a general level, theorizing about co-offending is still scarce. What is lacking most are systematic attempts to combine various notions and insights we already have.

Apart from further theorizing, a lot of work is needed in empirically testing the existing theories and hypotheses. Several studies are available yet in which competing perspectives about certain aspects of co-offending are analyzed (e.g., Reiss and Farrington 1991) and in which competing perspectives on co-offending are tested indirectly, for example, by distinguishing peer influence from co-offending (McGloin and Stickle 2011). Yet lacking are explicit attempts to empirically test theoretical notions about fundamental processes behind co-offending directly.

It is important to note that the study of co-offending is not only interesting in its own regard. It may also provide crucial information about the nature of delinquent behavior itself. The three general views on co-offending outlined earlier in this research paper (which we can summarize as the group, selection, and instrumental perspective) represent major perspectives in criminology. In this regard, empirical knowledge and further insights in co-offending may offer crucial information about the validity of etiological theories like social control, self-control, and social learning theory and of the usefulness of more situational approaches like routine activities and rational choice theories.

Finally, theoretical insight into co-offending may be useful to improve criminal justice efforts to prevent and intervene in crime. As many authors have argued, the impact of co-offending on the total amount of crime may be very large, and preventing offenders to cooperate with each other may offer a substantial contribution to crime reduction (see Andresen and Felson 2010; Felson 2003; Van Mastrigt and Farrington 2009).

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